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SCULPTURE, INDUSTRIAL DESIGN, 
ARCHITECTURE, AND THE 
RIGHT TO CONTROL USES OF PUBLICLY 
DISPLAYED WORKS 
Richard Chused* 
ABSTRACT—This article explores the anomalous ways in which copyright 
owners may control use of works they publicly display. Treatment of rights 
associated with publicly displayed sculpture and architecture are 
dramatically different. The copyright statute deprives owners of copyrights 
in constructed buildings of the ability to police the ways in which imagery 
or other uses of the publicly visible structure may be exploited by others. 
This article focuses on three related but different settings involving the 
public display of (1) a work of graffiti, (2) a large-scale sculpture, and (3) a 
building with sculptural features. Through an analysis of the differences in 
their treatment, this article investigates problems in extant law and suggests 
potential resolutions of the issues. 
 
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 55 
I.  STORIES AND THEIR COPYRIGHT CONSEQUENCES ................................................... 57 
A.  Pictorial, Graphic and Sculptural Works ..................................................... 57 
B.  Architecture .................................................................................................. 84 
II.  THE DENOUEMENT: IRRATIONALITY RESOLVED ..................................................... 97 
A.  Protecting Rights in the Use of Publicly Displayed Sculpture and 
Architecture .................................................................................................. 98 
B.  Public Display Controls.............................................................................. 110 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The right of copyright owners to control use of their publicly 
displayed work is not a rational construct. Similarly, the copyright code’s 
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definitions of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works on the one hand, and 
architectural works on the other, defy logic. Different statutory standards 
govern the way publicly visible aspects of both pictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural works on the one hand and architectural works on the other may 
be protected, fairly used, or commercially exploited. Copyright owners of 
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works control the use of their publicly 
displayed works, with an important exception allowing a work to be 
displayed by its owner at the place where it normally is housed.1 Control 
over use of architecture routinely visible to the public, however, is 
nonexistent. The copyright owner’s management of rights in a constructed 
architectural work visible in a public place was limited when the 
architecture provisions were added to the code in 1990.2 Anomalous 
distinctions in the ways publicly displayed works may be used are 
exacerbated by the quite different statutory definitions of pictorial, graphic, 
 
 1 The exclusive rights of a copyright holder are described in 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2017): 
Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive 
rights to do and to authorize any of the following: 
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or 
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; 
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and 
motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; 
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or 
other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and 
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a 
digital audio transmission. 
Permission to display where the work is located is granted by 17 U.S.C. § 109(c). 
 2 Architectural Works Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101–650, 104 Stat. 5133 (1990). The act 
declined to grant display rights to architecture by adding the following section to the code. 
17 U.S.C. § 120 - Scope of exclusive rights in architectural works 
(a) PICTORIAL REPRESENTATIONS PERMITTED.— 
The copyright in an architectural work that has been constructed does not include the right to 
prevent the making, distributing, or public display of pictures, paintings, photographs, or 
other pictorial representations of the work, if the building in which the work is embodied is 
located in or ordinarily visible from a public place. 
(b) ALTERATIONS TO AND DESTRUCTION OF BUILDINGS.— 
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(2), the owners of a building embodying an 
architectural work may, without the consent of the author or copyright owner of the 
architectural work, make or authorize the making of alterations to such building, and destroy 
or authorize the destruction of such building. 
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and sculptural creations and architectural works.3 These two sets of 
differences—management of publicly displayed works and definitional 
norms—lead to judicial resolutions of similar disputes in illogical and 
incoherent ways. This essay explores these problems, first by discussing 
situations in which similar uses of different types of copyrightable works 
were incompatibly resolved, and then by suggesting some solutions for 
these ongoing problems. 
I. STORIES AND THEIR COPYRIGHT CONSEQUENCES 
Three stories demonstrate the scope of these problems—two involving 
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works and the other regarding a 
construction project that may have been an amalgam of different types of 
work. The first two involve the non-permissive use of illegal graffiti or 
street art in an advertising campaign and the hotly contested use of a 
sculptural work in political ways the artist found totally unacceptable. The 
final story reviews a controversy over the use of a large scale outdoor 
architectural, or perhaps sculptural, urban landscape as a backdrop for a 
fantasy super-hero film. 
A. Pictorial, Graphic and Sculptural Works 
1. Street Art and the Public Display Rights of Illegally Made Works 
A series of controversies have arisen in the last twenty years over the 
use of street art by various businesses in advertising campaigns and other 
publicity efforts.4 Perhaps the most widely known and interesting is the 
 
 3 The differences arise in part because of the definitions of architectural works on the one hand, and 
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works on the other. Both are defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101: 
 An “architectural work” is the design of a building as embodied in any tangible medium 
of expression, including a building, architectural plans, or drawings. The work includes the 
overall form as well as the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements in the design, 
but does not include individual standard features. 
 . . . . 
 “Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” include two-dimensional and three-
dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art reproductions, 
maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including architectural plans. 
Such works shall include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their 
mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned; the design of a useful article, as defined in this 
section, shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent 
that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified 
separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the 
article. 
 4 See Jim Armitage, Corporate Vandalism? Anger as brands ‘steal’ street art for ads, THE 
EVENING STANDARD (May 3, 2017, 12:15PM), https://www.standard.co.uk/business/corporate-
vandalism-anger-as-brands-steal-street-art-for-ads-a3529681.html [https://perma.cc/R722-F29C] 
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2018 controversy between Jason “REVOK” Williams, a Los Angeles-based 
street artist, and H&M Clothing.5 Williams created the graffiti piece 
pictured below on a handball court at the William Sheridan playground in 
gentrifying Williamsburg, Brooklyn. 
  
 
(detailing controversy between British Air and a group of artists including widely known German artist 
Claudia “MadC” Walde, Argentinian Elian Chali, and Puerto Rican Alexis Diaz); Alex Braverman, 
Fair Use Fashion? Or Stolen Street Art?: Examining Copyright Protection for Graffiti through Katy 
Perry’s Moschino Gown, WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. BLOG (Nov. 17, 2015), 
http://ipjournal.law.wfu.edu/2015/11/fair-use-fashion-or-stolen-street-art-examining-copyright-
protection-for-graffiti-through-katy-perrys-moschino-gown/ [https://perma.cc/M8FK-2924] (describing 
a controversy caused by a dress created by fashion designer Moschino and worn by Katy Perry); Eileen 
Kinsella, ‘Livid’ Graffiti Artists Sue Fashion Label Vince Camuto for Using Their Artwork in Ads, 
ARTNET NEWS (July 11, 2017) https://news.artnet.com/art-world/graffiti-artists-sue-vince-camuto-
1019147 [https://perma.cc/C4FX-Q3ZX] (describing suit filed by four Brooklyn artists — Joseph 
“Rime” Tierney, Cary “Host18” Patraglia, Spencer “Taboo” Valdez, and Keith “Reme” Rowland, 
against fashion brand Vince Camuto for unauthorized use of work in advertisements); Benjamin Sutton, 
How Graffiti Artists Are Fighting Back against Brands That Steal Their Work, ARTSY (Aug. 3, 2018, 
8:30AM), https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-graffiti-artists-fighting-brands-steal-work (last 
visited Aug. 2, 2019) (describing challenge brought by Swiss artist Adrian “Smash 137” Faulkner 
against General Motors for the use of his work); Alan Feuer, G.M. Used Graffiti in a Car Ad. Should 
the Artist Be Paid?, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/17/arts/design
/general-motors-graffiti-artist-copyright.html [https://perma.cc/3SEF-H8GF] (same). See also Luma 
Zayad, Tagged: Graffiti’s Advancements in Mainstream Culture through Expanded Copyright 
Protection in Williams v. Cavalli, 26 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 161 (2016) 
(summarizing a series of older disputes). 
 5 See Alan Feuer, Brooklyn Lawsuit Asks if Illegal Graffiti Is Protected by Copyright Law, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/15/nyregion/brooklyn-graffiti-hm-
lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/FN3P-YL5L]. 
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FIG. 1: HANDBALL COURT GRAFFITI CREATED BY JASON “REVOK” 
WILLIAMS6 
 
He made it by creating a rig holding eight spray paint cans which 
simultaneously marked a wall when pressed against the surface.7 The New 
York City Department of Parks and Recreation claimed the piece was 
illegal—an act of vandalism and damage to city property that was later 
painted over by public authorities.8 
 
 6 Brooklyn Street Art, Revok sued by H&M, I LOVE GRAFFITI (2018), 
https://ilovegraffiti.de/blog/2018/03/15/revok-sued-by-hm/ [https://perma.cc/FE7T-QBH3]. 
 7 A brief video of the method is embedded in Keith Estiler, UPDATE: H&M Files Lawsuit Against 
Graffiti Artist, Denies Copyright Protection, HYPEBEAST (Mar. 16, 2018), https://hypebeast.com/2018/3
/hm-revok-copyright-infringement-case [https://perma.cc/L5NM-FDWY]. For more details about 
REVOK and his style, see Library Street Collective, Jason Revok, Systems, LSC GALLERY (2016), 
http://www.lscgallery.com/jason-revok-systems/ [https://perma.cc/EMP8-UCCJ]. 
 8 Complaint at 4, H&M Hennes & Mauritz GBC AB et al. v. Williams, No. 1:18-cv-01490 
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2018) 
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Before the work was removed, H&M developed a “New Routine” 
advertising campaign for some of its sportwear prominently using 
William’s work as a backdrop for an acrobatic, gymnast like “dance.”9 
 
FIG. 2: IMAGE FROM H&M “NEW ROUTINE” ADVERTISEMENT10 
 
Jeff Gluck, Williams’ lawyer, sent H&M a cease and desist letter 
protesting the violation of copyright laws.11 The company’s response was to 
file suit against Williams seeking a declaratory judgment that he could not 
 
 9 For a portion of the video see David Ashworth, H&M’s Scandelous “New Routine” Sportswear 
Campaign, YOUTUBE (Mar. 16, 2018)., https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ABhJuyAf3eI 
[https://perma.cc/NM7U-EGD5]. 
 10 Complaint, Exh. C at 8, H&M Hennes & Mauritz GBC AB, No. 1:18-cv-01490. 
 11 Complaint at 8, H&M Hennes & Mauritz GBC AB, No. 1:18-cv-01490. 
17:55 (2019) The Right to Control Uses of Publicly Displayed Works 
61 
hold a copyright in illegally painted graffiti works.12 In its complaint, H&M 
claimed that “Williams has no copyright rights to assert because his Graffiti 
was created through criminal conduct” and that “federal copyright 
protection is a privilege that does not extend to illegally created works.”13 
The story’s denouement was fast and embarrassing for H&M. Graffiti, 
hip-hop, and other artists complained bitterly that H&M’s legal position 
was culturally and legally untenable; they initiated an online movement to 
boycott the company that quickly gathered steam.14 Within a short time, 
H&M stepped back from the brink, voluntarily dismissed its case, and later 
settled the dispute not only by agreeing to remove Williams’s work from its 
ads, but also by contributing funds to various Detroit arts organizations in 
settlement of Williams’s copyright claims.15 The outcome of the dispute is 
one of many examples confirming the growing market power and widening 
aesthetic appeal of street art. H&M had the misfortune not only to use the 
work of a widely known and important artist,16 but also to make its ad just 
as the legal and cultural power of the graffiti community was rapidly 
growing. Advertisers using graffiti in their campaigns now routinely cave 
when challenged.17 And the stunning $6.75 million damage award in the 
long and tumultuous 5Pointz moral rights litigation18 sent a definitive 
warning to businesses that their assumptions about the free and easy ability 
 
 12 Id. at 6. 
 13 Id. at 5. 
 14 This was by no means the first time H&M found itself in hot water over an advertising 
campaign. A short time before the REVOK controversy, the company ran an ad with a picture of a 
black child wearing a sweat shirt with the phrase “Coolest Monkey in the Jungle.” Needless to say, the 
uproar was immediate and overwhelming. The company quickly apologized. Liam Stack, H&M 
Apologizes for ‘Monkey’ Image Featuring Black Child, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/08/business/hm-monkey.html [https://perma.cc/Z4SR-KGFB]. 
 15 Henri Neuendorf, Street Artist Revok and H&M Settle Dispute Over an Ad That Featured His 
Work Without Permission, ARTNET NEWS (Sep, 7, 2018), https://news.artnet.com/art-world/revok-hm-
ad-campaign-1345127 [https://perma.cc/A9NB-2JCV]. 
 16 Roger Gastman, the most important and knowledgeable chronicler of American graffiti, has 
published an important work on REVOK, CALEB NEELON, MATTHEW EATON, AND ROGER GASTMAN, 
REVOK (2014) and also curated a major display of his work in 2013 at the Jonathan Levine Gallery in 
Chelsea, New York City. Pose and Revok: Uphill Both Ways, JONATHAN LEVINE PROJECTS (June 29, 
2013) https://jonathanlevineprojects.com/exhibits/pose-and-revokuphill-both-ways/ 
[https://perma.cc/9AQU-XWS4]. REVOK’s work also was in a major show at the Los Angeles 
Museum of Contemporary Art in 2011, curated by Gastman and others. Art in the Streets at the MOCA, 
ARTE FUSE (April 20, 2011), https://artefuse.com/2011/04/20/art-in-the-streets-at-the-moca/ 
[https://perma.cc/66YL-YFMB]. 
 17 See the articles, supra note 4. 
 18 See Richard Chused, Moral Right: The Anti-Rebellion Graffiti Heritage of 5Pointz, 41 COLUM. J. 
L. & ARTS 583 (2018). The case recently was argued in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. See 
Amanda Ottaway, Graffiti-Whitewash Appeal Lands With Thud at 2nd Circuit, COURTHOUSE NEWS 
(Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.courthousenews.com/graffiti-whitewash-appeal-lands-with-thud-at-2nd-
circuit/ [https://perma.cc/XV6U-56UR]. 
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to use street art as they pleased without legal consequences were simply 
wrong. These cultural shifts in attitude about street art were given room to 
flower by two critically important aspects of copyright law—the 
protectability of original works of expression even if they are made in 
violation of non-copyright legal norms and the scope of control by owners 
of copyrights in pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works over the way others 
may use the works when they are publicly displayed. 
a. Legality of Graffiti 
Though there is some literature suggesting that illegal graffiti is not 
copyrightable,19 those “illegality” arguments are of dubious validity. Illegal 
work is not barred from protection. The United States Supreme Court has 
not directly spoken on the issue but has vigorously eschewed making 
content judgments in determining whether a work is protectable.20 The 
copyright statute makes that legal strand sensible. For even if a work’s 
creation or publication violates a non-copyright norm, nothing in the 
copyright statute bars criminal or civil prosecution for the illegal activity 
while still affirming the validity of any copyrights. For example, 
defamation claims may be pursued against authors and trespass charges 
may be brought against graffiti artists. Parties may force defamatory works 
to be withdrawn from the market and illegal graffiti to be taken down. 
Those obtaining judgments in such cases from writers or painters may levy 
on any profits gained from intellectual property royalties or art sales. But 
the copyrights themselves are not affected; they continue to exist. Someone 
reprinting a defamatory book may be subject to two law suits—one by the 
author of the book and the other by the person defamed. 
 
 19 See, e.g., Sara Cloon, Incentivizing Graffiti: Extending Copyright Protection to a Prominent 
Artistic Movement, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 54, 65–68 (2017); Celia Lerman, Protecting 
Artistic Vandalism: Graffiti and Copyright Law, 2 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 295, 316 (2013). 
 20 Marc J. Randazza, Freedom of Expression and Morality-Based Impediments to the Enforcement 
of Intellectual Property Rights, 16 NEV. L.J. 107, 133 (2015). The classic statement about the duty of 
courts to eschew aesthetic quality judgments was made by Justice Holmes in Bleistein v. Donaldson 
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903). In a case about the copyrightability of circus 
advertising posters, he wrote: 
 
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves 
final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious 
limits. At the one extreme, some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very 
novelty would make them repulsive until the public had learned the new language in which their 
author spoke. It may be more than doubted, for instance, whether the etchings of Goya or the 
paintings of Manet would have been sure of protection when seen for the first time. At the other 
end, copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the 
judge. Yet if they command the interest of any public, they have a commercial value—it would 
be bold to say that they have not an aesthetic and educational value—and the taste of any public 
is not to be treated with contempt. 
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The basic rule long has been that to be available for copyright 
protection a work simply must be “original” and “fixed” in a tangible 
medium of expression. The originality requirement is hardly stringent. 
Some small exercise of human creativity in the formation of a work is 
usually sufficient. Compose a mostly trite, bad poem and pat yourself on 
the back for producing a copyrighted work. While the fixation requirement 
mandates that a work be “sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more 
than transitory duration,”21 that standard does not embody any idea of 
permanence. The expectation that a work of graffiti will be erased or 
painted over at some point in the future does not mean that its visibility is 
transitory and therefore not protectable. Holdings that materials stored in 
computer memory for short periods are “fixed” under the copyright statute 
make that quite clear.22 In short, the works of REVOK were copyrighted, 
illegal or not. 
b.  Control Over Use of Public Displays 
The most important aspects of copyright law for purposes of the 
REVOK dispute are the exclusive rights of the owner of a copyright in a 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work to “display the copyrighted work 
publicly,” and to prevent further use of that work once it is visible to the 
public.23 While the owner of a particular tangible copy of a work has the 
right to display that copy in the place where it is located,24 others do not 
have the right to make their own copies, to display copies in other 
locations, or to publish copies in various media. The simplest example is 
provided by a painting hanging on a museum wall. When the artist sells 
that work, she retains the copyright interest in the absence of a written 
contract specifically transferring all of, or an exclusive right in, the 
intellectual property rights.25 Ownership rights in the physical object 
embodying the artistic expression, however, pass to the buyer of the piece; 
physical property rights in a copy of an expressive work are held by the 
owner of the object. That is treated as a separate bundle of interests from 
the intellectual rights.26 Strangers to both the property and intellectual rights 
in the painting, however, have no automatic right to use either one. 
 
 21 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010). 
 22 It makes no difference that street art often is temporary. Short term visibility is enough. Indeed, 
in the process of discussing modern transitory art installations, some have even argued that the 
limitation to “transitory” should be eliminated. See Megan M. Carpenter, If It’s Broke, Fix It: Fixing 
Fixation, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 355 (2016). 
 23 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (2002). 
 24 Id. § 109(c). 
 25 Id. § 204. 
 26 Id. § 202. 
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Despite the general conclusion that graffiti is copyrightable even when 
illegally crafted, the very odd wording of the copyright statute’s provisions 
on the public display right evokes complexities. Since copyright in such 
work is clearly held by the artist unless specifically conveyed to a buyer, 
REVOK held the public display interest in his street art. The work’s 
illegality was irrelevant. Property rights in the physical attributes of the 
work, however, are a bit less straightforward. If the work had been made 
with permission of the owner of a building, the copy of the work on the 
structure was owned by the party with title to the property, but the display 
right was both held by the artist and protected by the Visual Artists Rights 
Act’s moral right provisions limiting the building owner’s right to copy, 
mutilate, distort, or destroy the work.27 Normally works of visual art not in, 
or made part of, a building may not be mutilated if that action would harm 
the reputation of the artist or destroyed if the work was of recognized 
stature. But in the case of a work in or made part of a building with 
permission, the owner may in some cases mutilate or destroy a work, if 
notice is given to the artist ninety days before action is taken or if the artist 
 
 27 The full text of the statute on this point is in 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(1)-(2): 
 (1) In a case in which— 
(A) a work of visual art has been incorporated in or made part of a building in such a way 
that removing the work from the building will cause the destruction, distortion, mutilation, 
or other modification of the work as described in section 106A(a)(3), and 
(B) the author consented to the installation of the work in the building either before the 
effective date set forth in section 610(a) of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, or in a 
written instrument executed on or after such effective date that is signed by the owner of the 
building and the author and that specifies that installation of the work may subject the work 
to destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification, by reason of its removal, 
 then the rights conferred by paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 106A(a) shall not apply. 
(2) If the owner of a building wishes to remove a work of visual art which is a part of such 
building and which can be removed from the building without the destruction, distortion, 
mutilation, or other modification of the work as described in section 106A(a)(3), the author’s 
rights under paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 106A(a) shall apply unless— 
(A) the owner has made a diligent, good faith attempt without success to notify the author of 
the owner’s intended action affecting the work of visual art, or 
(B) the owner did provide such notice in writing and the person so notified failed, within 90 
days after receiving such notice, either to remove the work or to pay for its removal. 
For purposes of subparagraph (A), an owner shall be presumed to have made a diligent, good 
faith attempt to send notice if the owner sent such notice by registered mail to the author at the 
most recent address of the author that was recorded with the Register of Copyrights pursuant to 
paragraph (3). If the work is removed at the expense of the author, title to that copy of the work 
shall be deemed to be in the author. 
The references in this section to §§ 106A(a)(2) and (3) refer to the rights of authors to limit mutilation, 
distortion, or destruction of a work. 
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agrees contractually to waive moral rights.28 There is, therefore, a split in 
the rights of a building owner and an artist when the creative work is made 
with permission. 
As a result, fascinating conflicts between the owners of intellectual 
and physical property rights may arise. The recent 5Pointz dispute is a 
prime example.29 The works of street art in the complex were made with 
permission, but the building owners failed to obey the copyright statute 
when they white washed the compositions before demolishing the 
structures in anticipation of redeveloping the site.30 On the other hand, 
when the graffiti is installed illegally or without the permission of the 
owner of the building, the physical rights of the building owner take 
precedence if the graffiti is deemed undesirable.31 The statute only protects 
display rights and moral rights for “works in or made part of a building” 
when they are created with permission.32 Not surprisingly, therefore, the 
building owner has the right to remove from view a piece put up without 
permission—to, in short, terminate the public display right.33 
But in the case of the REVOK work on the city-owned handball court, 
the work was not placed on a building—defined by Copyright Office 
regulations as something that is “humanly habitable.”34 On its face, 
therefore, the statute placed the handball court artwork in the same shoes as 
any other two-dimensional work of fine art, such as a traditional 
composition on a canvas. While it is clear that REVOK retained the rights 
to control use of his street art in commercial advertisements regardless of 
whether the art was made with or without permission, the anomalous use of 
the word “building” in the moral rights provisions of the copyright statute 
would bar the city as owner of the handball court wall from destroying the 
work if it was of “recognized stature.”35 And that result would extend to all 
 
 28 See 17 U.S.C. § 113(d). 
 29 See Chused, supra note 18. I have eschewed exegesis here on the moral right issues involved in 
5Pointz because that would force me to repeat much of what is said in the 5Pointz article. Related issues 
surface in the next section on sculpture and the display right. 
 30 Id. at 613–15. 
 31 Id. at 606–07. 
 32 Id. at 589. 
 33 Id. at 597. The more complex relationship between physical and intellectual rights when graffiti 
is made on a building with permission of the owner plays out in 17 U.S.C. § 113(d). There actually is an 
intriguing and potentially controversial anomaly in the statute. § 113(d) mentions two scenarios—one 
about works placed in or on a building with permission of the owner and the other about placement 
without permission. But what about work placed on something other than a “building” as in the 
REVOK setting? Given the failure to craft a provision about such an event in § 113(d), the standard 
provisions of § 106A, barring mutilation or destruction, would presumably apply. 
 34 See 37 C.F.R. § 202.11(b)(2) (defining a “humanly habitable structure” as one “designed for 
human occupancy”). 
 35 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3). 
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cases where illegal art is placed on a structure rather than a building—
regardless of whether it was painted with or without permission, legally or 
illegally. If a similar creative endeavor was painted without permission on 
the wall of a school, however, the city or other owner of the property could 
take it down without penalty. That result seems unlikely to be well received 
by courts, but the statute appears to compel it. 
It would have been better if Congress had used a word like “structure” 
rather than “building” in the code to define both a work of architecture and 
to describe limitations on moral rights in works in or made part of a 
physical location. If we assume that judges will find a way to ignore the 
obvious dilemma, or to impose the same standards in structure cases that 
the statute imposes in cases involving buildings, the city then had the 
power to destroy the work—to effectively terminate the right to display the 
work where it was painted. That right, if it existed in the city, however, did 
not extend to H&M. That is what got the clothier in trouble. They had no 
legal right to use the illegality of the piece or the legitimacy or illegitimacy 
of its public display as a basis for claiming a right to use it in a commercial; 
that all was in the hands of the city or the artist. The merchandising chain 
was a stranger to the relationships surrounding both the intellectual and the 
tangible property rights. Since REVOK retained control over the 
intellectual display rights vis-à-vis all third parties, he could control how 
the publicly displayed images were used in ways other than the handball 
court wall, even if the city properly removed the graffiti. 
This is an important point for all pictorial, graphic, and sculptural 
works. Just because someone owns the physical copy of a notable work of 
art, does not mean that the owner may control how the work is displayed in 
venues other than where it is normally kept, unless the owner also has 
purchased one or more of the exclusive rights in the copyright.36 The 
dilemmas for those owning art works, but not their copyrights, arise in a 
number of intriguing arenas—even tattoos! Video game developers using 
likenesses of famous athletes whose bodies are emblazoned with tattoos 
have discovered much to their chagrin that they cannot rely on licenses 
from the athletes to use computer likenesses that display their body art 
unless they obtain a second license from the tattooists.37 Similarly, 
museums and gallerists must be careful before they make posters or other 
souvenirs of works they hold if the works are still protected by copyright, 
and the museums or galleries have not purchased intellectual interests in 
 
 36 Copyright interests, of course, can be assigned by an artist to others. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 204. 
 37 Jason M. Bailey, Athletes Don’t Own Their Tattoos. That’s a Problem for Video Game 
Developers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/27/style/tattoos-video-
games.html [https://perma.cc/Z43Z-QVEY]. 
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the works. To this day it is not clear that all museums and galleries fully 
understand the issue and cope with the legal issues in their daily activities. 
2. Outdoor Sculptural Works and Use of Their Public Displays 
One of the most celebrated outdoor sculptural works in the United 
States is Anish Kapoor’s Cloud Gate, colloquially known as The Bean, 
installed in 2006 in Millennium Park in Chicago. One commentator 
described the work as follows: 
As an object, Cloud Gate is undeniably seductive, at once 
monumental and inviting. It is also willfully opaque. From a distance it 
looks like a droplet of mercury, blown up to immense size. Up close, it 
becomes clear that the droplet is arched, creating a passageway on an east-
west axis, joining the city to Millennium Park and the lake further on. The 
space above this passageway has been hollowed out, creating a central 
cavity, which Kapoor describes as an omphalos or navel. From outside, 
Cloud Gate retains some Pop resonances—balloon, blood cell, mushroom, 
donut, UFO—while never succumbing to any one of them. Within the 
central cavity, though, it becomes a total environment, enveloping visitors 
in a silvery canopy, and at the same time breaching the boundary between 
sculpture and architecture.38 
  
 
 38 Jacob Mikanowski, Cloud Gate, Tilted Arc, THE POINT (2012), https://thepointmag.com/2012
/criticism/cloud-gate-tilted-arc [https://perma.cc/Q9VS-HZPC]. For another review of the work, see 
also Archana, Cloud Gate, ART IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE (July 10, 2015), 
https://artpublicsphere.wordpress.com/2015/07/20/cloud-gate/ [https://perma.cc/NX72-2ZCC]. 
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FIG. 3: ANISH KAPOOR’S CLOUD GATE39 
 
Walking around and under Cloud Gate is a remarkable experience. 
The mirrored surface reflects other-worldly views of the sky, people 
wandering in the park, and surrounding buildings. Viewed from under the 
work, the ambience resembles a carnival hall of mirrors. 
There have been two noteworthy recent controversies about Cloud 
Gate—one an intriguing spoof and the other a more emotional conflict. 
Each raises important issues about controlling the use of public displays of 
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works. Not long ago, a spoof emerged 




 39 Millenium Park Art, Architecture & Gardens, CHOOSE CHICAGO (2019) 
https://www.choosechicago.com/things-to-do/parks-and-outdoors/millennium-park/art-architecture-
and-gardens/ [https://perma.cc/7W4R-5SHE]. 
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FIG. 4: ANISH KAPOOR’S CLOUD GATE COVERED IN “FAUX” BLACK40 
 
Pictures like the one above circulated supposedly showing the 
sculpture coated with the pigment. The spoof emerged on April Fools’ Day 
in 2016 after public controversy erupted over Kapoor purchasing patent 
rights a bit earlier that year in a black pigment called Vantablack41 that 
absorbs virtually all light, reflecting nothing that a human eye can detect.42 
 
 40 Credit for the satire goes to The Editors, Anish Kapoor Coats Cloud Gate in the Darkest Black 
Known to Humanity, HYPERALLERGIC (Apr. 1, 2016), https://hyperallergic.com/287628/anish-kapoor-
coats-cloud-gate-in-the-darkest-black-known-to-humanity/ [https://perma.cc/8CZ4-E2C7]. The photo 
just above is credited to the City of Chicago, but that must either be part of the joke or a reference to the 
image that the publication edited to change the color. 
 41 For more on the color, said at the time of its invention, to be the darkest color on earth, see 
Vantablack, SURREY NANOSYSTEMS, https://www.surreynanosystems.com/vantablack 
[https://perma.cc/8M8C-2RRM]. It has recently been revealed that an even darker black has been 
invented. Kendall Trammel, There’s New Blackest Black Material, and it Can Even Cloak This Bright 
Sparkling Diamond, CNN (Sep. 18, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/style/article/mit-new-blackest-black-
material-scn-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/6GEZ-QG6T]. 
 42 Commentary effectively critiqued Kapoor for seeking to control the artistic use of a pigment—a 
step to which many artists vehemently objected. Kapoor purchased the patent rights from Surrey 
NanoSystems in February 2016. See Brigid Delaney, “You Could Disappear Into it”: Anish Kapoor on 
his Exclusive Rights to the “Blackest Black”, THE GUARDIAN (Sep. 25, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2016/sep/26/anish-kapoor-vantablack-art-architecture-
exclusive-rights-to-the-blackest-black [https://perma.cc/8MNJ-2D8Q]; Benjamin Wallace, This 
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Looking at it simulates peering into a visual black hole. If the interior of a 
concave half-moon shape is coated with the material and you place your 
face inside it so that you cannot see any of the rest of the world, you will 
feel completely disoriented.43 The use of Vantablack, as in the spoof picture 
above, would have totally transformed Cloud Gate. But it was, after all, a 
hoax—and a good one at that. 
The less humorous controversy was between Kapoor and the National 
Rifle Association. The N.R.A. placed a very fleeting, momentary shot of 
Cloud Gate in a nasty 2017 recruiting video variously called “The 
Clenched Fist of Truth” or the “Violence of Lies.”44 
 
FIG. 5: VIEW OF CLOUD GATE IN THE N.R.A. VIDEO45 
 
Company Created the Blackest Black Ever Known – and Only One Artist Can Use It, N.Y. MAGAZINE 
(Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.vulture.com/2016/04/vantablack-anish-kapoor.html 
[https://perma.cc/BCU4-9AVD]. 
 43 I have had that experience with a Kapoor half-moon shape covered with a different, very dark 
substance. 
 44 Complaint at 1, Kapoor v. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., No. 1:18-cv-01320 (E.D. Va. Oct. 23, 
2018). 
 45 Id. at 5. 
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Dana Loesch narrated the piece in a deeply chilling, menacing tone.46 
The shot of Cloud Gate appeared at eighteen seconds into the video and 
disappeared almost immediately.47 Though it displayed a full view of the 
work, its short period of visibility made it easy to miss when watching the 
video. 
Nonetheless, Kapoor was furious, releasing an emotional 
condemnation of the N.R.A. for using an image of his work. The release, in 
part, stated: 
”Cloud Gate” reflects the space around it, the city of Chicago. People visit the 
sculpture to get married, to meet friends, to take selfies, to dance, to jump, to 
engage in communal experience. Its mirrored form is engulfing and intimate. 
It gathers the viewer into itself. This experience, judging by the number of 
people that visit it every day (two-hundred million to date), still seems to carry 
the potential to communicate a sense of wonder. A mirror of self and other, 
both private and collective, “Cloud Gate”—or the “Bean” as it often 
affectionately referred to—is an inclusive work that engages public 
participation. Its success has little to do with me, but rather with the thousands 
of residents and visitors who have adopted it and embraced it as their “Bean”. 
“Cloud Gate” has become a democratic object in a space that is free and open 
to all. 
In the NRA’s vile and dishonest video, “Cloud Gate” appears as part of a 
montage of iconic buildings that purport to represent “Liberal America” in 
which the “public object” is the focus of communal exchange. Art seeks new 
form, it is by its nature a dynamic force in society. The NRA in its nationalist 
rhetoric uses “Cloud Gate” to suggest that these ideas constitute a “foreign 
object” in our midst. The NRA’s video gives voice to xenophobic anxiety, and 
a further call to “arm” the population against a fictional enemy. 
The NRA’s nightmarish, intolerant, divisive vision perverts everything that 
“Cloud Gate”—and America—stands for. Art must stand clear in its mission 
to recognize the dignity and humanity of all, irrespective of creed or racial 
origin.48 
Kapoor’s demand that the fleeting shot of Cloud Gate be removed 
from the video was initially rejected.49 He then filed suit in Chicago seeking 
damages for copyright infringement.50 The primary allegation was that 
 
 46 See NRATV, The Violence of Lies, THE WASHINGTON POST (June. 30, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/national/nra-ad-the-violence-of-lies/2017/06/30/295dde84-
5d93-11e7-aa69-3964a7d55207_video.html [https://perma.cc/T2UA-RYFU]. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Anish Kapoor, Open Letter on the NRA’s unauthorized use of Cloud Gate (Mar. 12, 2018), 
http://anishkapoor.com/5104/letter-to-the-nra [https://perma.cc/WC8S-BMB4]. 
 49 Complaint at 6, Kapoor, No. 1:18-cv-01320. 
 50 Id. at 2. 
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“Defendant infringed plaintiff’s copyright in CLOUD GATE by, inter alia, 
filming or videotaping it, making internal copies, incorporating it into its 
video ‘The Clenched Fist of Truth,’ . . . and distributing and displaying it to 
the public on television and through the internet.”51 The case was later 
transferred to the Eastern District of Virginia where the N.R.A. is 
headquartered and settled near the end of 2018.52 The settlement simply 
provided that the N.R.A. would remove the image of Cloud Gate from the 
video. No money changed hands. 
These two controversies over Cloud Gate open several windows into 
the scope of control copyright owners retain over use of their publicly 
displayed works. While the legal issues surfaced here were unlikely to 
provide Kapoor with any relief, some of the them were fascinating and 
intriguing, if not difficult. The nature of copyright infringement rules and 
fair use are both relevant. Though REVOK obtained a favorable settlement 
in his dispute with H&M, that does not negate the importance of basic and 
important defenses in typical public display infringement cases—de 
minimis use and fair use in the case of Cloud Gate. 
a. De minimis Use 
In any copyright infringement case, a plaintiff must show that the 
defendant’s use was substantial. Minor or trifling violations will be 
excused. A classic example in the public display arena is Gottlieb 
Development LLC v. Paramount Pictures Corp.53 In the Paramount movie 
What Women Want, Mel Gibson played an advertising executive with the 
knack of sensing the thoughts of women.54 In one scene, he and his co-star 
Helen Hunt brainstormed with other employees about marketing consumer 
products to women.55 During the scene, a Silver Slugger pinball machine 




 51 Id. at 6. 
 52 Sopan Deb, N.R.A. to Pull Image of Sculpture From Its Video, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/06/arts/design/anish-kapoor-nra-bean.html [https://perma.cc/S7V6-
EXN4]. A stipulation of settlement was filed on Dec. 17, 2018. 
 53 590 F.Supp.2d 625 (S.D.N.Y 2008). 
 54 Id. at 629. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 629–30. 
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FIG. 6: SCENE FROM WHAT WOMEN WANT WITH PINBALL MACHINE 
IN THE BACKGROUND57 
 
The court described the episode: 
The three-and-a-half-minute scene depicts a brainstorming meeting in the 
office of the advertising agency. The meeting takes place in a large room with 
a relaxed and casual atmosphere—the room contains recliner chairs and bar 
stools, and on the far wall there is a large poster board prominently displaying 
the word “PLAY.” A mini basketball hoop appears on one side of the room, 
and a statue of a penguin appears on the other. Approximately eight people are 
sitting in a circle. Behind one woman is a table soccer-or “foosball”-game. As 
Gibson’s character pitches various ideas for advertisements, the “Silver 
Slugger” appears intermittently in the background, next to another pinball 
machine. It appears only for seconds at a time, always in the background, and 
always partially obscured by Gibson, a recliner chair, or a bar stool. The 
“Silver Slugger” does not appear in any shot by itself, nor is it part of the plot. 
It does not appear anywhere else in the Film, nor does any character ever refer 
to it. It is simply part of the background in one limited scene.58 
 
 57 Id. at 628. 
 58 Id. at 630. 
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The court concluded that the presence of the machine in the scene was 
de minimis and therefore not a substantial infringing use.59 A similar, and 
probably stronger, argument was available to the N.R.A. in its dispute with 
Kapoor. The use of Kapoor’s work was for less than a second—a truly 
fleeting glimpse. In addition, while Kapoor claimed that his work was used 
to signify the awful characteristics of liberalism and gun control advocacy, 
it is extremely difficult to glean that general message of the video as 
specifically referring to Cloud Gate. Though the entire ad certainly had that 
flavor, Cloud Gate was not specifically referenced as emblematic of any 
particular social or political point of view. In short, it is a strong argument 
maybe made that the very brief appearance of an image of Kapoor’s work 
in the N.R.A. clip was de minimis. 
This contrasts in interesting ways with the REVOK dispute. Though 
the advertisement in which the street art appeared was quite brief (just over 
ten seconds) in comparison to the three-and-a-half-minute scene in What 
Women Want, the street art formed the entire background for most of the 
commercial video.60 The acrobatic dancer used the wall as a prop to plant a 
foot for leverage to do a somersault in midair and land with arms stretched 
out and a large smile on his face.61 In short, the art was the central focus of 
both the ad and its message that H&M’s “New Routine” clothing line was 
designed for an energetic, athletic, young population. It played on the 
notion that younger people appreciated street art and the vibrancy many of 
its compositions brought to urban life. The centrality of the graffiti and its 
importance in conveying a commercial message contrasted decisively with 
the irrelevant, incidental, and ignored presence of the pinball game in the 
background of the movie scene or the passing presence of Kapoor’s work 
in the N.R.A video. De minimis use, in short, measures not merely the 
length of a use but its significance in the overall display setting. It operates, 
at least in these three cases, as a first cousin to fair use. 
b. Fair Use 
In addition to the use of Cloud Gate by the N.R.A. likely being de 
minimis, the appearance of Cloud Gate in both the Vantablack spoof and 
the N.R.A. video was likely protected by fair use under standards typically 
applied in that realm. Vastly over-simplifying an extraordinarily messy 
batch of precedents, fair use allows any of us to employ materials protected 
by copyright if our new use is transformative and doesn’t negatively affect 
 
 59 Id. at 632. 
 60 See Complaint, Exh. C at 8, H&M Hennes & Mauritz GBC AB, supra note 10. 
 61 Id. at 3–5. 
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the market for the original work.62 Parody, for example, often qualifies as 
fair use. It typically is not the sort of product authors will create about their 
own work. And inevitably any parody must refer to a known creation and 
in some way transform or mock the original work in order for it to be 
successful and meaningful. This was recognized by the Supreme Court in 
1994 in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.63 As the Campbell court 
opined: 
Parody’s humor, or in any event its comment, necessarily springs from 
recognizable allusion to its object through distorted imitation. Its art lies in the 
tension between a known original and its parodic twin. When parody takes 
aim at a particular original work, the parody must be able to “conjure up” at 
least enough of that original to make the object of its critical wit recognizable. 
* * * What makes for this recognition is quotation of the original’s most 
distinctive or memorable features, which the parodist can be sure the audience 
will know. Once enough has been taken to assure identification, how much 
more is reasonable will depend, say, on the extent to which the song’s 
overriding purpose and character is to parody the original or, in contrast, the 
likelihood that the parody may serve as a market substitute for the original. 
But using some characteristic features cannot be avoided.64 
In the Vantablack setting, use of an image of Cloud Gate covered in 
black was wholly appropriate. It thoroughly transformed the original 
work’s visual appearance and had absolutely no impact on the economic 
value of the sculpture or on Kapoor’s art marketing prowess. When placed 
with tongue in cheek commentary on Kapoor’s efforts to control use of the 
color Vantablack, the parody is biting, obvious, and protected. In the 
explicitly labeled “Satire” column in Hyperallergic where the above 
blackened image of Cloud Gate was published, the editors claimed Kapoor 
was interviewed about the revamped sculpture, humorously stating: 
”The public has had a decade to interact with the reflective surface of 
‘Cloud Gate,’ and felt it was time for a change,” Kapoor told Hyperallergic. 
“Whereas the sculpture was originally about play and surface appearance, I 
think the Vantablack version is more about introspection, about becoming 
disoriented, lost, and enveloped in an overwhelming void of nothingness.”65 
Kapoor took no steps to contest the spoof. (Hopefully he chuckled 
instead.) 
 
 62 The literature on the subject is enormous. Trying to provide a list of the best readings is a 
hopeless task. Anyone looking for a workable summary might as well check out Wikipedia. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fair_use [https://perma.cc/LJ68-CC4R]. 
 63 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 64 Id. at 588. 
 65 The Editors, supra note 40. 
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The fair use issue in the N.R.A. setting also was easily resolvable 
under standard analysis, though for different reasons. As noted, the fleeting 
use likely eliminated any copyright claim, but would fair use operate if the 
case went forward? The glimpse of Cloud Gate in the video posed 
absolutely no economic risk to the value of the work. And the appearance 
of the work in a political recruiting video was a type of use commonly 
protected by fair use, even if the use seemed irrationally inappropriate to 
the artist and copyright owner, and to much of the public. Commentary by 
critics, jokes by comedians, and political controversy touch the core of 
practices normally protected by fair use. They traditionally are deemed to 
be an intrinsic part of the market’s operation in creative industries and 
necessary to insure energetic and widespread understanding of and 
discourse about the artistic community. 
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc.66 was a dispute similar 
in many ways to Cloud Gate. In the November 1983 issue of Hustler 
Magazine, the scatological ad parody critical of Moral Majority’s leader 
Jerry Falwell pictured below was published. It contained a dialog about 
Falwell having a sexual experience with his mother in an outhouse.67 
Falwell and Moral Majority responded in part by creating a brochure 
containing an image of the Hustler ad and asking Falwell’s supporters for 
donations to counter the unfair Hustler critique or, as some would have it, 
parody. Hustler then sued Moral Majority claiming copyright infringement. 
The winning response, of course, was fair use.68 In the Hustler dispute, both 
sides could claim that severely critical commentary and equally critical 
retorts were protected. Fair use was given a great deal of room to operate. 
The same thing probably would have happened in the Cloud Gate dispute. 
 
 66 See 796 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1986). Jerry Falwell also sued Hustler for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress and lost in the United States Supreme Court. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 
U.S. 46 (1988). 
 67 796 F.2d at 1149–50. 
 68 Id. 
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FIG. 7: THE HUSTLER PARODY AD 
 
c. Fair Use Reconsidered 
This last fair use perspective, however, if subjected to some different 
analytical strictures, may be the most interesting and difficult aspect of the 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
78 
right to control use of publicly displayed pictorial, graphic, and sculptural 
works. In recent years, there have been a series of disputes about 
organizations, politicians, and other controversial parties using copyrighted 
work to promote their causes without seeking permission from or over the 
vigorous objections of copyright owners or performers. The existence of a 
strong disagreement over the social and cultural meanings of a copyrighted 
work, as just noted, is typically a basis for granting a fair use claim, not an 
issue raised to undermine it. Perhaps courts shy away from initiating a 
destabilizing thought process that might raise concerns under the First 
Amendment, but it may be time to introduce the problem into fair use 
analysis. Rather than simply disregarding the relevance of such dyspepsia 
by copyright owners, however, we might do well to step into the debate. 
Most of these disputes have involved music, not pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural works.69 Many of them have been easy to resolve as an 
intellectual property matter, because the music was used in a forum or by 
an organization with a blanket license to perform the music or with 
permission from relevant copyright owners.70 In some of the cases 
musicians or composers aggravated by the use of their work no longer held 
any copyright interests in the works used.71 Their complaints arose from 
social or political, not legal, concerns.72 Though some politicians stopped 
using work upon request in order to avoid further public controversy, 
commentators have struggled to find a theory allowing musicians to seek 
 
 69 The best summary of recent controversies may be found in Arlen W. Langvardt, Musicians, 
Politicians, and The Forgotten Tort, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 429 (2017). 
Langvardt takes the position that use of other common doctrines, such as publicity rights or false 
endorsement claims under the Lanham Act, don’t reach the nub of the problem. He suggests instead that 
the old and largely forgotten common law tort of “false light publicity” would work better. It’s an 
interesting theory. See also Courtney Willits, Candidates Shouldn’t “Cruz” Through Political 
Campaigns: Why Asking for Permission to Use Music Is Becoming So Important on the Campaign 
Trail, 16 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 457 (2017); Elizabeth Long, Trumped by False 
Endorsement: Musicians Still Might Have Intellectual Property Rights to Prohibit Politicians from 
Using Their Songs Despite Copyright Licenses, 44 N. KY. L. REV. 171 (2017); Taylor L. Condit, The 
Need for Songwriters’ Control: A Proposal to Prevent Unwanted Uses of Musical Compositions at 
Political Rallies, 47 SW. L. REV. 207 (2017); Krista L. Cox, Pharrell Raises Copyright Claim Against 
Trump’s Use of “Happy” at Campaign Rally After Pittsburgh Synagogue Shooting, ABOVE THE LAW 
(Nov. 1, 2018), https://abovethelaw.com/2018/11/pharrell-raises-copyright-claim-against-trumps-use-
of-happy-at-campaign-rally-after-pittsburgh-synagogue-shooting/ [https://perma.cc/4TCJ-CH36]; 
Eveline Chao, Stop Using My Song: 35 Artists Who Fought Politicians Over Their Music, ROLLING 
STONE (July 8, 2015), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-lists/stop-using-my-song-35-
artists-who-fought-politicians-over-their-music-75611/ [https://perma.cc/84SQ-GR6D]. 
 70 See Long, supra note 69, at 171–72. 
 71 See Cox, supra note 69. 
 72 Id.; Chao, supra note 69. 
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relief even in cases where use was made with appropriate copyright 
permissions.73 In such cases, fair use claims obviously are irrelevant. 
In other cases, as in Cloud Gate where the artist held copyright in his 
work, the difficulties in claiming use was unfair were compounded by the 
now well-known Constitutional limitations on using legal norms to control 
highly critical or inflammatory commentary about a public person, 
organization, or artistic endeavor. After New York Times v. Sullivan74 and 
Time, Inc. v. Hill,75 publicly important personalities must demonstrate that 
use of allegedly defamatory statements or false light publicity must be 
undertaken with malice.76 Some might argue that a similar constraint must 
be imposed on any effort to limit fair use provisions in the Copyright Act in 
ways allowing artists to constrain grossly inappropriate displays that distort 
the meaning of a publicly displayed work of visual art in offensive political 
or cultural ways. 
The theory in such a case would be that a video like that made by the 
N.R.A. would dramatically distort the meaning and creative content of 
Cloud Gate—suggesting in unwarranted ways either that the artist creating 
it supported the N.R.A.’s position or that the sculpture’s existence was 
emblematic of America’s moral and political decay. In this setting, such 
imagery might, under a revised fair use theory,77 be inappropriate under the 
 
 73 Langvardt, supra note 69. 
 
 74 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 75 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
 76 Landvardt, supra note 69, at 480–495. A false light cause of action alleges that a defendant 
publicly presented a person in a false light that would be deeply offensive or embarrassing to a 
reasonable person. The cases typically involve claims that the defendant wrongly said a person had a 
certain belief, took an action not actually carried out, or participated in certain events during their life. 
 77 17 U.S.C. §107 (2006) provides: 
 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted 
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means 
specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching 
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an 
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular 
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include— 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial 
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is 
made upon consideration of all the above factors. 
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first fair use factor instructing courts to consider “the purpose and character 
of the use.”78 This contention, as far as I know, has not been raised to date. 
It not only treads closely to the sorts of tort theories involving defamation 
and false light publicity that invoke Constitutional limitations, but also 
moves beyond the standard conceptions of fair use to encompass highly 
insulting but culturally based uses not involving parody. 
To work through some of the issues, consider a setting in which a 
work like Cloud Gate was used in a video in a substantial rather than a de 
minimis way. In addition, assume that the video was not an artistic, critical 
evaluation of the aesthetics of the piece, nor a parodic use, but a lengthy 
castigation of the sculpture in a personal diatribe or in a highly unflattering 
or misleading social commentary or context. Here’s a transcription of the 
N.R.A. verbal onslaught used during the video showing the publicly 
displayed Cloud Gate. 
They use their media to assassinate real news. They use their schools to teach 
children that their president is another Hitler. They use their movie stars and 
singers and comedy shows and award shows to repeat their narrative over and 
over again. And then they use their ex-president to endorse “the resistance.” 
All to make them march. Make them protest. Make them scream racism and 
sexism and xenophobia and homophobia. To smash windows, burn cars, shut 
down interstates and airports, bully and terrorize the law-abiding — until the 
only option left is for the police to do their jobs and stop the madness. 
And when that happens, they’ll use it as an excuse for their outrage. The only 
way we stop this, the only way we save our country and our freedom, is to 
fight this violence of lies with the clenched fist of truth. 
I’m the National Rifle Association of America. And I’m freedom’s safest 
place.79 
In the actual video Cloud Gate’s brief appearance occurred along with 
the line at the end of the first paragraph: “And then they use their ex-
president to endorse ‘the resistance.’”80 Suppose instead that the sculpture 
 
 78 There also is an intriguing possibility that moral right provisions in 17 U.S.C. §106A protect 
authors from distortions or mutilations of works of visual art that are insulting depictions rather than 
physical alterations. Traditionally moral right in the United States has only dealt with physical 
distortions or mutilations. Altering or recklessly restoring a painting is one thing. Maliciously using an 
image of a work in a setting that an artist views as deeply insulting or inappropriate is thought to be in a 
different realm. 
 79 Don Irvine, Liberals Accuse New IRA Ad of Inciting Violence, ACCURACY IN MEDIA (June 30, 
2017), www.aim.org/don-irvine-blog/liberals-accuse-new-nra-ad-of-inciting-violence/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z8GP-DV8A]. 
 80 NRA, Join the National Rifle Association (June 29, 2017), https://www.facebook.com/NRA
/videos/1605896562755373/ [https://perma.cc/GGB9-2QZ8]. 
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appeared for ten seconds while this revised first paragraph with changes 
from the original italicized or struck through, played: 
They use their media and art to assassinate real news. They use their schools 
to teach children that their president is another Hitler. They use their movie 
stars and singers and comedy shows and award shows and artists to repeat 
their narrative over and over again. And then they use their ex-president to 
endorse their cultural and political “the resistance.” 
Should such a display be justifiable as fair use? 
While the answer is unclear, the question is worth pondering. If 
personal or irrationally critical depictions of a creative work are made in a 
cultural or political diatribe, does that mean they should almost 
automatically escape a copyright infringement allegation because they are 
fair use? In the revised Cloud Gate story just described, the longer 
visualization of the work was surrounded with nastily framed language 
intended to present the sculpture as part of a large social conspiracy to 
“assassinate true news” and “endorse cultural and political ‘resistance.’”81 
Does the first fair use factor in 17 U.S.C. §107 commanding the courts to 
consider “the purpose and character of the use” as one analytical factor 
leave room for declaring that it runs in favor of the copyright owner in a 
setting like this? Is a showing of malice necessary before the factor may be 
treated as favoring the copyright owner? 
An apt comparison can be made between this example and the first 
major Supreme Court fair use case—Harper & Row v. Nation 
Enterprises.82 The Nation used a purloined manuscript to publish segments 
of Ford’s account of the 1974 pardon of Richard Nixon contained in a soon 
to be published Gerald Ford memoir for which Time, Inc. had agreed to 
pay $25,000.83 The Court relied heavily on the notion that authors had 
presumptive control over the ways their works would initially be revealed 
to the public and that unpublished manuscripts were therefore entitled to a 
high level of copyright protection—a notion vaguely rejected by Congress 
when it added a new sentence to the end of the fair use section in the 
copyright code. But the Court’s possible over-reliance on the unpublished 
status of the soon to be released Ford memoir must be read in light of its 
analysis of the first fair use factor dealing with the purpose and character of 
the use. In addition to the Court noting that The Nation’s intent was to 
scoop the main story and preempt the value paid by Time for the privilege 
 
 81 Id. 
 82 471 U.S. 539 (1985). The payment was to be in two segments of $12,500. The first had been 
made by the time THE NATION article was released. The second payment was not made and the lawsuit 
resulted. 
 83 A TIME TO HEAL: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF GERALD R. FORD (1979). 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
82 
of first releasing the story to the public, it also criticized the magazine for 
its intentional misbehavior: 
Also relevant to the “character” of the use is “propriety of the defendant’s 
conduct, 3 Nimmer §13.05[A] * * *. “Fair use presupposes ‘good faith’ and 
‘fair dealing.’” Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates, 293 F.Supp. 130, 146 
(SDNY 1968) * * *. The trial court found that The Nation knowingly 
exploited a purloined manuscript. * * * Unlike the typical claim of fair use, 
The Nation cannot offer up even the fiction of consent as justification. Like its 
competitor newsweekly, it was free to bid for the right of abstracting excerpts 
from “A Time to Heal.” Fair use “distinguishes between ‘a true scholar and a 
chiseler who infringes a work for personal profit.’” Wainwright Securities Inc. 
v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d, at 94, quoting from Hearings on 
Bills for the General Revision of the Copyright Law before the House 
Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 8, pt. 3, p. 1706 (1966) 
(statement of John Schulman). The trial court found that The Nation 
knowingly exploited a purloined manuscript. Unlike the typical claim of fair 
use, The Nation cannot offer up even the fiction of consent as justification.84 
A fair use claimant entering the fray with a seriously tainted frame of 
mind, the Court suggested, cannot easily justify reliance on fair use 
doctrine to provide it with a defense to infringement. And note well that the 
Court did not impose any requirement that the taint arose from malicious 
actions. Although making deeply maligning claims about the meaning of a 
work certainly is not the same as reliance on a purloined manuscript, it 
does raise the same general question—the import of a party’s state of mind 
when using a copyrighted work and then claiming fair use. The Court’s 
treatment of The Nation’s misbehavior was appropriate. Since fair use 
analysis is an open-ended factor analysis, the nature of the defendant’s state 
of mind is only one of many facts that must be taken into account. It is not 
a highly focused issue like malice in a defamation case. It is balanced 
against the creativity of the defendant’s handiwork, the impact of that work 
on the market for the plaintiff’s copyrighted product, the scale of the 
copying undertaken by the defendant, and other factors the court 
reasonably elects to analyze. My contention, therefore, is both simple to 
grasp and limited in its impact. It is only that the frame of mind behind 
copying a work can be so problematic so as to justify a conclusion that the 
“purpose and character” of its use cannot easily be labeled as fair under the 
first factor dealing with the nature and character of the use. While stating 
the issue that way obviously is vague, that is no different than many other 
difficult line- drawing efforts made in the fair use arena. Perhaps Kapoor 
 
 84 471 U.S. 539, at 562–563. 
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should be able to more easily challenge a fair use claim in the revised 
example at issue here. 
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B.  Architecture 
1. The Leicester Case: Sculpture or Architecture? 
Andrew Leicester v. Warner Brothers85 was a fascinating case that 
coped with the line between sculpture and architecture and, as a result, 
faced the array of differences in the statutory definitions of the two forms 
of creativity and in the contrasting treatment of the right of copyright 
owners to control the ways public displays of their works are used. 
Sculptural objects with some utilitarian uses are protected only if the 
aesthetic contents are separable from their utility.86 The right of copyright 
owners to control uses of publicly displayed works eligible for copyright, 
however, is quite broad, subject of course to common defenses, such as de 
minimis presence and fair use. Architecture, by contrast, is defined to 
include its form and arrangement of spaces without regard to its 
usefulness.87 But control by architects over most uses of their publicly 
displayed, constructed works are barred.88 17 U.S.C. §120(a) provides that: 
The copyright in an architectural work that has been constructed does not 
include the right to prevent the making, distributing, or public display of 
pictures, paintings, photographs, or other pictorial representations of the work, 
if the building in which the work is embodied is located in or ordinarily 
visible from a public place. 
The legislative history of this section clearly suggests that Congress 
intended to deprive copyright owners of works of architecture of the 
exclusive right to control most uses of their publicly displayed works. 
The definitional and public display issues for both sculpture and 
architecture were at stake in Leicester. The complex dispute arose over the 
use in a super-hero film—Batman Forever—of images of a redevelopment 
project in central Los Angeles at Figueroa and Eighth Streets.89 The main 
part of the real estate venture, on land purchased from the Los Angeles 
Community Redevelopment Agency, called for construction of a twenty-
four story office building.90 R&T Development Corporation 
 
 85 232 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2000). The district court opinion is not reported but may be found at 
Andrew Leicester v. Warner Bros., 1998 WL 34016724 (S.D. Cal. 1998). 
 86 See the definition of “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” in 17 U.S.C. §101 (2010). 
 87 See supra note 3. 
 88 For related commentary see, David K. Stark, Grand Theft Architecture: Architectural Works in 
Video Games After E.S.S. Entertainment v. Rockstar Games, 25 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 429 (2010); 
Andrew Inesi, Images of Public Places: Extending the Copyright Exemption for Pictorial 
Representations of Architectural Works to Other Copyrighted Works, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 61 (2005). 
 89 Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1213. 
 90 Id. at 1214. 
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(“Developer”)91 purchased the land from the agency and hired TAC 
International (“Architect”) to serve as architect for the project. Agency 
rules required that a certain percentage of the cost be used for art projects.92 
Architect commissioned Andrew Leicester (“Landscape Sculptor”) to 
create the required artistic elements in and around a courtyard area on the 
south side of the planned office structure.93 Part of the courtyard design 
called for the construction of five columns or towers along Figueroa Street 
to maintain a streetwall effect and create a grand entrance to the courtyard 
and office building.94 Two images of the some of the towers are pictured 
below,95 the first with an image of the office building behind the towers. 
 





 Replicas of the Figueroa Street development became elements of the 
background imagery in the Batman Forever super-hero film.96 In 1994 
 
 91 To make the story easier to follow, I provide a brief description of each of the main actors—
developer, architect, and landscape sculptor—in the creation of the project. 
 92 Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1214. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 The images may be found at http://www.publicartinla.com/Downtown/ZanjaMadre
/column2.html [https://perma.cc/NL2K-Q4TZ]. 
 96 Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1215. 
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Warner Brothers approached Developer seeking permission to photograph 
the property for use in the movie.97 Without consulting either Architect or 
Landscape Sculptor, Developer granted Warner Brothers permission to 
make replicas and pictorial representations of the development for use in 
the film.98 Portions of the works were used in the movie, as well as in 
various promotional materials.99 The two columns pictured above with 
circular structures at their peaks, designed as part of the required artistic 
investment in the project, were among the items used in Batman Forever.100 
Segments of Architect’s building project also showed up in the film as the 
Second Bank of Gotham. Here are two samples containing the work of both 
Architect and Landscape Sculptor.101 
 
FIG. 9: FIGUEROA STREET STREET DEVELOPMENT IMAGES USED IN 
BATMAN FOREVER 
 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 The first is at Second Bank of Gotham, BATMAN ANTHOLOGY WIKI, 
http://batmananthology.wikia.com/wiki/Second_Bank_of_Gotham?file=SecondBank.jpg 
[https://perma.cc/ZP3G-X7C2]. The second is at Sid Spano, Batman Forever (1995) Review, SID 
SPANO’S MOVIE REVIEWS AND NEWS (SEP. 30, 2014), http://sidspano108.blogspot.com
/2014/09/batman-forever-1995-review.html [https://perma.cc/7G7K-Q8DA]. 
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2. The Legal Issues in Leicester 
A series of issues surfaced in the case. First, the copyright ownership 
provisions in the contracts between Developer, Architect, and Landscape 
Sculptor were complex and ambiguous. Second, disagreements arose over 
whether some of the artistic aspects of the project were sculptural and 
others architectural or whether everything was part of the architecture 
associated with the main office building.102 Controversies over the 
copyright relationships between the sculptural and architectural features of 
the development arose because of the statutory differences in the scope of 
protection afforded to various aspects of the project. That led to the 
relevance of §120(a)’s limitations on control over third party use of 
publicly displayed architectural works becoming a decisive arena of 
contention. 
Without reviewing in detail all of the contractual controversies, suffice 
it to say that their resolution led to a strange set of relationships between 
Developer, Architect, and Landscape Sculptor. First, the trial and appellate 
courts found that different provisions of the agreements governed the rights 
of Warner Brothers to make two- versus three-dimensional likenesses of 
the Figueroa Street project.103 Based on construction of the contractual 
terms, the court concluded that Developer had an exclusive right to make or 
grant others the right to make three-dimensional replicas or models of the 
buildings and related structures.104 Exclusive control over two-dimensional 
 
 102 Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1215. 
 103 Id. at 1215, 1220. 
 104 Id. at 1220. 
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images, however, remained in the hands of Architect and Landscape 
Sculptor as joint authors105 of the streetwall towers. Though Architect’s 
non-exclusive grant of authority to Developer to use the joint works in two-
dimensional imagery was valid,106 Developer’s attempt to reassign the same 
license to Warner Brothers failed. The court held that non-exclusive 
assignees like Developer could not further transfer those rights; that 
authority remained with Architect and Landscape Sculptor as joint owners 
of the exclusive rights in two-dimensional images.107 The result meant that 
the only real dispute in the case was over Developer’s invalid grant of 
authority to Warner Brothers to make two-dimensional images of the 
Figueroa Street development for use in the movie and in advertising. 
Warner Brothers was free to make only three-dimensional replicas. 
Whether certain features Landscape Sculptor worked on with 
Architect were distinct, separate sculptural works or part of the 
architectural contours of the larger office building project turned out to be 
the crucial issue in the case. The only features of the development 
Landscape Sculptor worked on that Warner Brothers used in two-
dimensional imagery were the towers or columns along Figueroa Street 
pictured above.108 If those columns were separate sculptural works, then the 
exclusive right to control use of publicly displayed works was controlled by 
the straightforward terms of 17 U.S.C §106(5), the statute’s exclusive right 
to control public display and associated uses as discussed in reviewing the 
disputes over REVOK’s graffiti and Kapoor’s Cloud Gate. If the towers 
were part of the architecture, however, then the broad exception to control 
over use of publicly displayed works embedded in 17 U.S.C §120(a) 
governed. 
3. Sculpture or Architecture? 
The court opined that the streetwall columns were architectural—a 
result that certainly is questionable. According to the court, several features 
 
 105 The copyright statute provides that two or more authors will hold a joint interest in a work if 
they intend “that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary 
whole.” 17 U.S.C. §107. The court concluded that such an intention was present because Leicester and 
TAC worked closely together in designing the streetwall portion of the project. Leicester, 232 F.3d at 
1215. 
 106 Leicester did not participate in these negotiations. But like tenants in common in tangible 
property law, joint authors of exclusive rights in copyright each have the right to assign their interests to 
a third party. While they have the obligation to share royalties and other benefits, the transfers are valid. 
That meant that R&T could assign a non-exclusive right to Warner Brothers without Leicester’s 
participation. Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1215. 
 107 Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1220. 
 108 Id. at 1216. 
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of the columns led to this result.109 First, they were deemed to be part of a 
“streetwall” concept integrated into the overall architectural scheme.110 The 
Community Redevelopment Agency plan for the area required that the 
building line along Figueroa Street be maintained.111 Second, Architect and 
Landscape Sculptor worked together to plan the elements of the 
streetwall;112 that is why they were deemed to be joint authors of the work. 
Third, though the interior elements of the courtyard behind the streetwall, 
gate, and fencing were part of an overall artistic design created solely by 
Landscape Sculptor, the columns and other elements of the structures along 
Figueroa Street were said by the court to serve separate purposes and 
different aesthetic goals from the courtyard features.113 The courtyard plan, 
called Zanje Madre (or Mother Ditch), “tell[s] an allegorical story of Los 
Angeles,”114 the court said, by visualizing the developments that brought 
water to the city. Fourth, the height, materials, and elements of the columns 
echoed similar features of the office building and were, therefore, well-
integrated into the overall architectural design and quite separate from the 
Zanje Madre.115 Finally, Landscape Sculptor’s contention that various 
decorative elements of the columns making up the streetwall should be 
separated from the features deemed by the court to be architectural,116 and 
therefore, provided their own display rights was rejected. It was deemed 
not possible to rationally make such a separation from the architectural 
plan. Since the statutory definition of a sculptural work in 17 U.S.C. §101 
requires that the artistic expression of a work be separable from any 
utilitarian content—here the building—in order to obtain protection, 
Landscape Sculptor could not claim any intellectual property rights. 
Not surprisingly there was a dissent in the case on the final conclusion 
that the sculptural elements of the columns could not be conceptually 
separated from the overall architectural design.117 Judge Fisher accused the 
majority of misreading the district court opinion by concluding that the 
lower court decided as a factual matter that the design elements of 
Landscape Sculptor’s work could not be conceptually severed from the 
building plan.118 Fisher was correct in claiming that the lower court actually 
 
 109 Id. at 1217–19. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at 1214. 
 115 Id. at 1217–19. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. at 1225–1236. 
 118 That is, in fact, what the majority did. See id. at 1219. 
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concluded that no sculptural work that was part of a building could be 
treated as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work. District Judge Hupp 
wrote: 
[T]he intent of Congress was to substitute the new protection afforded 
architectural works for the previous protection sometimes provided under the 
conceptual separability test for non-utilitarian sculptures (such as gargoyles 
and stained glass windows) incorporated into a work of architecture. If this 
construction is correct, the enactment of Section 120(a) had the effect of 
limiting the conceptual separability concept to situations not involving 
architectural works.119 
Judge Hupp’s construction of §120(a) was illogical at best. If taken 
literally it would mean that murals, sculptural reliefs, and other items long 
thought to be protected as pictorial or sculptural works when lodged in a 
building have lost their separate copyright status. Moreover, his opinion is 
entirely inconsistent with the moral right protections for works “in or made 
part of” a building embedded in 17 U.S.C. §113(d).120 It is difficult to 
imagine that moral right provision was totally repealed by 17 U.S.C. 
§120(a) when protections for buildings in which sculptural works are 
embedded gained copyright protection. Judge Fisher’s conclusion that a 
sculptor and an architect might own separate copyrights for two different 
kinds of works—one for sculpture embedded in a building and the other for 
the building—seems indisputably correct.121 And it is worth noting that the 
towers, along with the Zanje Madre courtyard features, were design 
features that fulfilled the Los Angeles Community Redevelopment Agency 
requirement that a portion of the development cost be devoted to artistic 
endeavors.122 
Concurring Judge Tashima, in a somewhat cryptic opinion,123 reached 
an intermediate position but thought the result reached by Judge Rymer 
was proper. Tashima apparently agreed that a sculptural work that was part 
of an overall architectural design should be treated as part of the building 
without regard to its conceptual separability, but he was unwilling to 
conclude that all sculptural works embedded in a work of architecture met 
that test. What it meant for a work to be part of an overall architectural 
design was left open in his opinion. The bottom line was that the sculptural 
elements of the columns along Figueroa Street were not subject to the 
 
 119 The unreported opinion may be found at Andrew Leicester v. Warner Bros., 1998 WL 
34016724 *6 (S.D. Cal. 1998). 
 120 See supra note 27. 
 121 Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1229–30. 
 122 Id. at 1214. 
 123 Id. at 1220. 
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traditional test for determining the copyrightability of a sculptural work 
embedded in a utilitarian object or architectural work. 
4. Different Norms for Sculpture and Architecture 
The problem in Leicester arose largely because of illogical 
distinctions in the basic terms of copyright protection for sculpture and 
architecture. As previously noted,124 the definitions in the act for pictorial, 
graphic, and sculptural works, and works of architecture are significantly 
different. The former “include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as 
their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned; the 
design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be considered a 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, 
such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can 
be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, 
the utilitarian aspects of the article.”125 A work of architecture, however, 
“includes the overall form as well as the arrangement and composition of 
spaces and elements in the design, but does not include individual standard 
features.”126 
To explore the potential consequences of these definitions, apply them 
to I.M. Pei’s East Wing of the National Gallery of Art in Washington, D.C. 
and to Frank Gehry’s well-known Pritzker Pavilion in Millennium Park in 
Chicago, not far from Anish Kapoor’s Cloud Gate. Images of the two 
structures are below.127 
  
 
 124 See supra note 3. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 The image of the East Wing is available at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:NGA-
pjt1.jpg [https://perma.cc/9ST2-6Z4C]. The image of the Pritzker Pavilion is available at 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/architecture-org/files/modules/jay-pritzker-pavilion-eric-allix-rogers-05.jpg 
[https://perma.cc/VYM6-8S5M]. 
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FIG. 10: I. M. PEI’S EAST WING OF THE NATIONAL GALLERY AND 
FRANK GEHRY’S PRITZKER PAVILION IN MILLENNIUM PARK 




 Are these designs sculptural works or works of architecture? Could 
they (or should they) be both? The Leicester court seemed to reflexively 
conclude that the two categories are mutually exclusive. However, there is 
nothing in the code justifying that conclusion.128 They will qualify as a 
“sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that . . . sculptural 
features . . . can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing 
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”129 Just because 
something is large, capable of accommodating use by human beings, and 
designed by an architect doesn’t mean it lacks separable sculptural 
qualities. But if the East Wing is considered “utilitarian,” as architecture 
generally was prior to its addition as a separate category of protected 
copyrightable work in 1990130, it may not be possible to meet the pictorial, 
graphic or sculptural work test. It is very difficult to identify any sculptural 
elements of I. M. Pei’s architectural design that are separate in any 
conceptual or actual way from the building’s utility as a museum. No 
particular part of the design can be removed without dismantling the 
exterior shape or the interior flow. While it is possible to remove all two- 
and three-dimensional artistic artifacts contained in the museum’s 
collection and other features of the museum from the building and think of 
it as a sculpture, that is not really a separation of utility and sculptural 
design for it leaves the basic features of the building totally intact. Unless 
the entire design is considered to be a sculpture as well as a work of 
architecture, certainly a plausible conclusion, it can only be the latter. 
On the other hand, it may be easier to treat the Pritzker Pavilion as a 
sculpture, at least in part. The various curved metallic features surrounding 
the stage area are “separable”—hung on a metal support frame that also 
encloses many of the various utilitarian parts of the pavilion serving 
orchestras and other performance groups that make use of the facility. An 
image from behind the building, displayed below,131 makes this quite clear. 
 
 128 There is ambiguity about this point in the history of the code. Some legislative history suggests 
the two categories must be kept separate. But the code language itself does not automatically yield that 
result. See Vanessa N. Scaglione, Note, Building upon the Architectural Works Protection Copyright 
Act of 1990, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 193, 201–04 (1992). 
 129 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010). 
 130 For a history of the adoption and background of the Architectural Works Copyright Protection 
Act of 1990 see Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright in the 101st Congress: Commentary on the Visual Artists 
Rights Acts and the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, 14 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & 
ARTS 477 (1989). 
 131 Available at https://en.wikiarquitectura.com/building/jay-pritzker-pavilion-at-the-millenium-
park/ [https://perma.cc/H39V-SSNV]. 
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FIG. 11: BACKSTAGE VIEW OF FRANK GEHRY’S PRITZKER PAVILION 
 
These images suggest the major problem with the definition of a 
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural work in the Copyright Act—that sleek, 
modern building designs or parts of those designs struggle to meet the 
definitional test of sculpture; while appliqué or other features that may 
easily be conceptually or actually removed from buildings, leaving the 
utilitarian features behind, are easier to protect as sculptural. The same 
problem exists in the industrial design arena. Consider two industrial 
designs from famous cases—the Ribbon bicycle rack denied copyright 
protection in Brandir International, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber, Co.132 
and the lamp base granted protection in Mazer v. Stein.133 The idea for use 
of the ribbon shape for securely storing bicycles actually arose from a wire 
sculpture.134 Nonetheless, the court concluded that its utilitarian aspects 
could not be separated from its sculptural qualities.135 Compare this with the 
classic case of Mazer v. Stein from which the wording of the present 
statutory definition of pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works was derived.136 
 
 132 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987). Image available at https://www.ribbonrack.com/about.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/889H-XFAC]. 
 133 347 U.S. 201 (1959). Images available at http://coolcopyright.com/contents/chapter-4/mazer-v-
stein [https://perma.cc/M9ML-4Z67]. 
 134 Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1143. 
 135 Id. at 1147. 
 136 The legislative history of the 1976 Act makes clear that the intention of Congress was to codify 
the result of Mazer. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 54–55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5659, 5667–68. 
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In Mazer, lamp bases, pictured below, were deemed to be copyrightable—
separable from their utilitarian functions as lamps by simply removing all 
the electrical parts.137 The two cases vividly demonstrate the differences in 
judicial treatment of sleek, modern designs and traditional shapes and 
imagery. 
FIG. 12: STATUARY LAMP BASES IN MAZER V. STEIN 
 
 
 137 Mazer, 347 U.S. at 202, 212–13. 
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 In Leicester the utility/expression dichotomy inherent in the 
definition of sculptural works was used as a baseline by all three judges for 
arguments over whether the design of the columns on Figueroa Street could 
be treated as sculptural. For the majority, they could not be separated from 
the utility of the building itself because they were closely integrated into 
the overall design of the project.138 For the dissent the outcome was 
dependent on application of the traditional test described here, a test that 
allowed the columns to be treated as separable from the design of the 
building itself and for various features of the towers such as the circular 
elements at the peaks to be treated as discrete from the bodies of the 
towers.139 Gaze again at the images of the Figueroa Street project above.140 
The relevant columns are those with circular structures at the top. The 
majority relied upon the use of similar materials in the columns and 
building, and on the streetwall impact of the columns and fencing.141 The 
dissent, on the other hand, found it relatively easy to separate the novel 
features of the column tops from the rest of them.142 The fact that the 
columns were separated by a significant distance from the building itself 
contributed to his conclusion that sculptural works were present.143 Partial 
 
 138 Andrew Leicester v. Warner Brothers, 232 F.3d 1212, 1215 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 139 Id. at 1225. 
 140 See FIG. 9. 
 141 Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1218. 
 142 Id. at 1221–22. 
 143 Id. 
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use of the same materials as the main office buildings didn’t automatically 
negate the sculptural qualities of the shapes used in the column, shapes that 
were quite distinct from anything in the office structure. The dissenting 
judge understood much more about the nature of sculptural endeavors and 
the variety of ways they can be linked to structures without being 
subsumed by them. 
But once the Leicester court concluded that the columns were 
architectural and that their sculptural elements could not be separated from 
the rest of the project, the plaintiffs had to lose. The broad exemption from 
control over use of publicly displayed architecture in §120(a) rendered the 
claims hopeless. Since the section precluded owners of architecture 
copyrights from pursuing licenses from those making, distributing, or 
publicly displaying images of the structures, there was nothing Landscape 
Sculptor, now labelled as a part designer of a building, could do to require 
payment from Warner. Put Anish Kapoor’s Cloud Gate in the same spot, 
however, and the result would have been transformed. For none of the 
factors leading the Leicester majority to conclude the towers were 
architectural would be present if Kapoor’s work was part of the street wall 
concept mandated by the Los Angeles Community Redevelopment 
Agency. And that’s the point. It is irrational that two copyrightable works 
publicly displayed in virtually identical ways end up with wholly different 
protective envelopes. It is clear that the Copyright Act must be revised to 
either protect both from use as significant backdrops in audiovisual works 
or to protect neither one. 
II. THE DENOUEMENT: IRRATIONALITY RESOLVED 
Several important aspects of the exclusive right to publicly display 
copyrighted works have already been discussed—the contours of 
controlling the display right itself, the differing definitions of sculptural and 
architectural works, and the impact of the public display exemption for 
architectural works. And some conclusions have been suggested. First, 
aspects of the standard defenses to allegations that the public display right 
has been violated—most notably fair use—could stand a closer look. 
Declining to consider irrationally demeaning displays of works as less 
likely candidates for fair use seems inappropriate. Second, the definition of 
a work of architecture as encompassing only “buildings” should be 
reconsidered. Architecture encompasses a range of elements beyond those 
usable by people. It is irrational to exclude non-habitable structures from 
coverage. That becomes painfully apparent when it is recognized that the 
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moral right provisions for works associated with buildings in 17 U.S.C. 
§113(d) do not apply at all to graffiti or other works on constructed features 
of our environment that are not buildings. That conclusion leads to a result 
most will find strange—that the same moral rights applicable to classical 
paintings and sculpture on traditional surfaces hanging in museums also 
apply to graffiti painted without permission on structures that are not 
buildings. 
There are other anomalies exposed in this essay, however, that are 
both more important and more difficult to resolve. First, the definitional 
differences between sculpture and architecture created part of the tension in 
the resolution of Leicester. That tension should be resolved. Second, the 
principal reason for writing this essay—the irrational differences in the 
display rights of pictorial, graphic, and sculpture work on the one hand and 
architecture on the other need to be reconceived. 
A. Protecting Rights in the Use of Publicly Displayed Sculpture and 
Architecture 
Copyright in a sculptural work is dependent on finding that its 
“sculptural features . . . can be identified separately from, and are capable 
of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.” In 
contrast, a work of architecture is a building and “includes the overall form 
as well as the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements in the 
design, but does not include individual standard features.” The differences 
are profound. Separating design and utility is an entirely different 
enterprise from discerning the overall form and arrangement of spaces and 
elements of a building. The former requires an inquiry that is incompatible 
with the goals of many artists and industrial designers. The latter, on the 
other hand, fits nicely with the predilections of both artists and architects 
and should become the basic definitional standard for sculpture, industrial 
design, and architecture. 
The very notion that aesthetics and function, or in copyright 
vocabulary, expression and utility, should be split apart when legal 
protection is considered has been anathema to many artists and architects 
for decades—long before the present statutory definition of pictorial, 
graphic, and sculptural works was adopted in 1976. While the ways 
expression and utility are envisioned have been a subject of debate since 
the advent of culture, they came into special focus in the late nineteenth 
century with the rise of modern art and architecture. The phrase form 
follows function, initially written as “form ever follows function,” was 
coined by the famous architect Louis Sullivan shortly after his landmark 
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Wainwright Building was constructed in St. Louis in 1891.144 He was a 
member of the Chicago School of Architecture that, stimulated in part by 
the Great Chicago Fire of 1871 that demolished large sections of the central 
city, revolutionized commercial construction at the end of the nineteenth 
and beginning of the twentieth centuries. In a famous essay Sullivan wrote: 
Whether it be the sweeping eagle in his flight, or the open apple-blossom, the 
toiling work-horse, the blithe swan, the branching oak, the winding stream at 
its base, the drifting clouds, over all the coursing sun, form ever follows 
function, and this is the law. Where function does not change, form does not 
change. The granite rocks, the ever-brooding hills, remain for ages; the 
lightning lives, comes into shape, and dies, in a twinkling. 
It is the pervading law of all things organic and inorganic, of all things 
physical and metaphysical, of all things human and all things superhuman, of 
all true manifestations of the head, of the heart, of the soul, that the life is 
recognizable in its expression, that form ever follows function. This is the 
law.145 
As can be seen from the pictures below of the Wainwright Building 
and some of its beautiful cornice detail work,146 Sullivan’s ideas did not 
mandate the elimination of all ornate features. Quite the contrary, once the 
basic function of a building was established, both its engineering and shape 
became determinable. In this case, a steel frame allowed the shape and 
fenestration of the building to reflect its function as an office container. 
Crafting designs taken from nature—here floral filigree and other natural 
sculptural shapes in the cornice and other areas of the building—reflected 
Sullivan’s desire to integrate the inherent function of a building into the 
nature and essence of human existence. Indeed, many of the most famous 
early skyscrapers built in Chicago, New York, and other cities featured the 
same aesthetic. The early years of Frank Lloyd Wright’s career were in 
Chicago, including a stint at the firm of Adler & Sullivan between 1888 
and 1893 as the Wainwright Building was being designed. Many of 
Wright’s early buildings reflected some of the same stylistic features. 
While it is possible to think of aspects of the Wainwright Building’s ornate, 
sculptural facade as separable from the rest of the shape of the building, 
and therefore sculptural for copyright purposes, Sullivan (and Wright) 
would have rebelled at the idea that the work mimicking aspects of nature 
 
 144 Louis H. Sullivan, The Tall Office Building Artistically Considered, LIPPINCOTT’S MAG., Mar. 
1896, at 403, 408. 
 145  Id. 
 146 Available at https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/52/Wainwright_Building_-
_2012.JPG [https://perma.cc/58VW-4MTT]; https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Wainright_6.jpg 
[https://perma.cc/6QPL-WD8M]. The copyright commons terms are provided on these pages. 
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was merely conceptually separable appliqué. Rather it was inherent in the 
way nature, form, and function worked together in the process of designing 
and using a building, just like they worked together in nature. 
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Others worked with related ideas, but reduced form and function to 
minimalist designs—a natural outgrowth of architectural theories like 
Sullivan’s. One of the primary goals of the famous Bauhaus School—the 
creative force behind much of early twentieth century art, industrial design, 
and architecture—was to craft designs that were simple, useful, and 
beautiful. While some of those working there early in its history used 
various crafts in their designs that followed closely in the footsteps of the 
Chicago School of Architecture’s use of natural motifs, others such as Le 
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Corbusier, Mies van der Rohe, and Walter Gropius147 developed a much 
sparer architectural style; painters at the school like Paul Klee and Wassily 
Kandinsky followed suit in their early careers.148 When Corbusier designed 
a model house called Villa Savoye a generation after the construction of the 
Wainwright Building, he opined that it was a “machine for living.”149 
Designed with thin cement support columns and largely unobstructed 
floors, it allowed for maximum flexibility and modification over time as 
families or owners changed. Heavily influenced by the Bauhaus School and 
other modernists of the time, he developed a style that intimately wove 




 147 Walter Gropius left Germany in 1934 after Hitler’s rise to power and came to the United States 
in 1937. He continued to design many buildings, including his own house in Lincoln, Massachusetts 
outside of Boston. It is a fine example of his design style. Images of the house available at 
https://www.historicnewengland.org/property/gropius-house/ [https://perma.cc/UJ53-N94F]. 
 148 See, e.g., Alexxa Gotthardt, A Brief History of Bauhaus Master and Father of Abstraction Paul 
Klee, ARTSY (Apr. 25, 2016), https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-what-you-need-to-know-
about-paul-klee [https://perma.cc/WXN5-RHFN]; Bauhaus, KANDINSKY, 
https://www.wassilykandinsky.net/bauhaus.php [https://perma.cc/NAC4-3EDK]. 
 149 The house was constructed between 1928 and 1931. A nice summary of Le Corbusier’s ideas 
may be found in Kurt Kohlstedt, Machines for Living In: Le Corbusier’s Pivotal “Five Points of 
Architecture”, 99% INVISIBLE (Feb. 19, 2018), https://99percentinvisible.org/article/machines-living-le-
cobusiers-pivotal-five-points-architecture/ [https://perma.cc/X8WB-UUA9]. 
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FIG. 14: LE CORBUSIER’S VILLA SAVOYE, CONSTRUCTED BETWEEN 
1928–1931 
 
From the image of Villa Savoye above150 it is easy to see why Le 
Corbusier’s aesthetic was so closely related to other well-known painters, 
sculptors, and industrial designers of the early twentieth century. Various 
aesthetic media were culturally tightly linked, both at the Bauhaus and in 
the larger culture. Many of the designs at the famous Bauhaus School, 
where Le Corbusier worked for a time, were specifically oriented toward 
the merger of aesthetics and function in easily identifiable, highly useful 
designs. Some of their most famous objects were chairs by Marcel Breuer 
and Mies van der Rohe. Two are pictured below, the first by Breuer and the 
second by Mies.151 While the contemporary copyright definition of 
sculptural works may well have excluded these designs from coverage for 
lack of separability were it applicable a century ago when they were 
created, the present architecture definition fits them to a tee. A similar 
 
 150 Available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:VillaSavoye.jpg [https://perma.cc/2LBE-DNVZ]. 
 151 The image of the Breuer on the left is available at https://www.moma.org/collection/works/2851 
[https://perma.cc/GUN6-EFP4]; the Mies image is available at https://www.metmuseum.org/art
/collection/search/482117 [https://perma.cc/54XP-EAL4]. 
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conclusion applies to a Bauhaus designed lamp152 pictured to the right 
below. 
 
FIG. 15: CHAIRS BY BREUER (LEFT) AND MIES (CENTER); BAUHAUS 
LAMP (RIGHT). 
   
  
The powerful influence of the form/function movement is reflected in 
two images of other creations—one of the 1902 Ward Willits House by 
Frank Lloyd Wright153 and the next of a 1936 Piet Mondrian painting.154 In 
both designs the desire was to achieve a statement of basic form and line. 
In the house, of course, there is a function; it is revealed in the form and 
shape of the dwelling. But the overall appearance of the two is quite 
similar—the use of simple lines to demarcate fields of visual interest, the 
classic rectangularity of the compositions, and the overall similarity in 
aesthetics. Imagine the Willits House on a very snowy day. The black and 
white composition created by such weather would mimic the Mondrian 
work in many ways. A vague idea of that result is provided by the image of 




 152 Available at https://www.moma.org/collection/works/1546 [https://perma.cc/9TB9-ZPQR]. It is 
not attributed to a particular craftsperson but is listed as a 1928 creation of the Metal Workshop at the 
Bauhaus School. 
 153 Available at http://www.greatbuildings.com/buildings/Ward_Willits_House.html 
[https://perma.cc/C5ZZ-Z4S7]. 
 154 Composition in White, Black, and Red, MOMA, https://www.moma.org/collection/works/78310 
[https://perma.cc/Z7Z6-AQCB]. 
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FIG. 16: FRANK LLOYD WRIGHT’S WARD WILLITS HOUSE (UPPER 
LEFT); PIET MONDRIAN PAINTING (UPPER RIGHT); SHERLE WAGNER 
PLUMBING FIXTURE AD (LOWER LEFT); CROPPED IMAGE OF WARD 





One of my favorite useful design advertisements that communicates 
the same set of Bauhaus-based ideas is for a set of bathroom sink fixtures. 
The caption for the 1979 advertisement pictured above, “SHERLE 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
106 
WAGNER ERASES THE LINE BETWEEN FUNCTION AND ART,” 
captures perfectly the aesthetic of much art, architecture, and industrial 
design since the turn of the twentieth century.155 While certain features of 
these fixtures, such as the bulbous faucet handles, might be thought of as 
separable from their utility and therefore protectable as sculptural works 
under the Copyright Act, it defies the goals of the manufacturer—to say 
nothing of much of the rest of the industrial design world—to require that 
step in order to obtain protection. 
While there are no obvious aesthetic reasons why different standards 
should apply to the various designs of buildings, works of art, and useful 
articles, revising the law to treat them in similar ways is not a 
straightforward proposition. First, protection of industrial designs as a 
separate class of intellectual property objects was specifically rejected by 
Congress when the 1976 code revamping the law was adopted.156 Later 
proposals have also failed to pass, except for a very limited set of 
provisions protecting vessel hulls adopted in 1998.157 Reviewing the 
reasons for removal of design protection from the 1976 Act is important. 
Second, copyrights generally last for a period of life of the author plus 
seventy years for individually crafted works or ninety-five years from 
publication for works for hire.158 While that period is surely too long for all 
copyrights,159 it becomes clearly objectionable for industrial designs.160 Is it 
possible to both change the definitional standard for sculptural works to 
encompass industrial designs while denying such works long-term 
protection? Can the definitions of sculpture and utilitarian articles be made 
to mesh coherently? 
When the copyright law was rewritten in 1976, the Senate passed 
industrial design provisions as a separate part of their version of the 
 
 155 Available at http://www.archive.sherlewagner.com/legacy/ [https://perma.cc/W5WT-XP9X]. 
 156 For a fulsome history of Congressional consideration of industrial design protection in the 
Copyright Act see Industrial Design Protection: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual 
Property, and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., on H.R. 
902, H.R. 3017 and H.R. 3499, at 436–91 (1991) (statement of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights). 
 157 17 U.S.C §§ 1301–1332 (2000). 
 158 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012). 
 159 Though my concerns were brushed aside by the United States Supreme Court in Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194 (2003) by the tribunals giving broad authority to Congress to determine the 
appropriate duration for copyrights, the result has been harshly critiqued. See Qianwei Fu, Eldred v. 
Ashcroft: Failure in Balancing Incentives and Access, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1755 (2005). 
 160 A similar issue arises with respect to the present use of copyright law to cover software, now 
often called “firmware” because it is designed into the electronics of devices. It has become so much a 
part of modern digital technology that such long-term protection is out of place. Technology changes 
much too quickly for any long duration period to be rational in this arena. 
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statute.161 It was stripped out by the House before adoption.162 The Senate 
proposals contained two different definitions—one for pictorial, graphic, 
and sculptural works and another for useful articles.163 The former lacked 
any language about separability, leaving only a simple definition of such 
works as “two-dimensional and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, 
and applied art.”164 The latter merged the content of utility and various 
aspects of the design into a single definition, reproduced below.165 That 
language, together with the duration proposals, are critically important for 
purposes of this essay.166 When the House removed design protection from 
the legislation, the separability language of the definition of pictorial, 
graphic, and sculptural was inserted into the code to preserve copyright as a 
distinct arena from industrial design. That left designs covered under 
copyright law only if they had sculptural features separable from the 
object’s utility. In hindsight, that move was an error of judgment. 
The covered useful designs were described in the failed Senate 
proposal as follows: 
DESIGNS PROTECTED 
Sec. 201. (a) The author or other proprietor of an original ornamental design 
of a useful article may secure the protection provided by this title upon 
complying with and subject to the provisions hereof. 
(b) For the purposes of this title— 
(1) A “useful article” is an article which in normal use has an intrinsic 
utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or 
to convey information. An article which normally is a part of a useful article 
shall be deemed to be a useful article. 
(2) The “design of a useful article”, hereinafter referred to as a “design”, 
consists of those aspects or elements of the article, including its two-
dimensional or three-dimensional features of shape and surface, which make 
up the appearance of the article. 
(3) A design is “ornamental” if it is intended to make the article attractive or 
distinct in appearance. 
(4) A design is “original” if it is the independent creation of an author who did 
not copy it from another source. 
 
 161 See S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 11–12 (1975). 
 162 See supra note 156. 
 163 S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 3–4. 
 164 Id. at 3. 
 165 Id. at 4. 
 166 Both may be found in S. REP. NO. 94–473. 
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DESIGNS NOT SUBJECT TO PROTECTION 
Sec. 202. Protection under this title shall not be available for a design that is— 
(a) not original; 
(b) staple or commonplace, such as a standard geometric figure, familiar 
symbol, emblem, or motif, or other shape, pattern, or configuration which has 
become common, prevalent, or ordinary; 
(c) different from a design excluded by subparagraph (b) above only in 
insignificant details or in elements which are variants commonly used in the 
relevant trades; or 
(d) dictated solely by a utilization function of the article that embodies it; 
(e) composed of three-dimensional features of shape and surface with respect 
to men’s, women’s, and children’s apparel, including undergarments and 
outerwear.167 
There are several very notable features of these proposals to protect 
“an original ornamental design of a useful article.”168 First, according to 
§201, the utility and design of a useful article are treated as a single 
entity.169 In contrast to the present definition of a sculptural work, there is 
no requirement that aesthetics and function be split.170 Such an item has “an 
intrinsic utilitarian function” not constructed “merely to portray . . .[its] 
appearance.”171 The “ornamental design of a useful article”—the expression 
protected by the scheme—”consists of those aspects or elements of the 
article, including its two-dimensional or three-dimensional features of 
shape and surface, which make up the appearance of the article” and is 
“intended to make the article attractive or distinct in appearance.”172 And 
§202 excludes from coverage “a standard geometric figure . . . motif, or 
other common shape . . . which has become prevalent, or ordinary.”173 In 
essence these provisions function much like the definition of architecture 
which includes the overall form and composition of spaces, while 
excluding standard features. Its use would dramatically simplify the 
question as to whether a three-dimensional object with useful attributes 
could be treated as a sculptural work. Any original attractive aspect of a 
useful item, whether easily considered to be a separable aspect of the piece 
 
 167 S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 39. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. 
 170 See 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 171 S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 39. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. 
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or not, would be capable of receiving protection. The definition would have 
the substantial impact of treating any three-dimensional item with a 
utilitarian function as an ornamental design rather than a sculpture. The 
esoteric and often difficult task of splitting apart the various aspects of a 
three-dimensional object that has useful functions would end. 
The term provisions in §205 (not quoted here) are equally 
intriguing.174 Protection would begin on the date of publication of the 
registration and run for a maximum of ten years, divided into an initial term 
of five years and a renewal term for another five. While the renewal 
provisions are cumbersome and unnecessary, the basic idea that design 
protection should be short-lived makes imminently good sense. But is it 
possible to mesh such provisions into the overall copyright scheme 
covering sculpture, design, and architecture? Can article design protection 
for ten years (or any other short term that might be proposed) work with the 
term for sculpture and architecture lasting for life plus seventy years for 
individual or joint works or ninety-five years for works for hire? 
On the surface it can be argued that the terms of protection for 
architecture—basically another form of ornamental design of useful 
objects—and useful industrial designs should be similarly treated. But in 
reality it makes a great deal of sense to treat them quite differently. Major 
architectural works tend to be unique or near-unique, expensive to design 
and construct, and unlikely to be market dominating products. It is 
unnecessary to treat them differently from other unique aesthetic designs. 
While the general copyright term is too long, that applies equally to both 
architecture and most other expressive undertakings covered by the act. 
Neither needs that long a term to create incentives for their introduction 
into the culture. Industrial designs, however, are much more often subject 
to short term fads—a basic reason for providing protection—and short-term 
market utility. Both their design and utility fashions frequently come and 
go with some rapidity. There is no reason to protect them for a long time—
one that extends well beyond their typical economically useful life. All the 
industrial designers really need is a reasonable market head start in order to 
protect their investment and create incentives for well designed products. In 
addition, in those atypical settings where industrial designs become 
ubiquitous parts of our environment for significant periods of time, there 
are good reasons to open up the market to competition after a fairly short 
period of time to lower the risk of market dominance for a popular 
 
 174 Id. at 40. 
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product—a risk not nearly as likely for architectural works or other 
standard works covered by copyright.175 
The shorter term of protection for useful designs would create a new 
split in protection—one between sculpture and useful products 
ornamentally designed. The former would retain the present lengthy term 
of protection; the latter would be quite short. The boundary line between 
the categories can be drawn as tightly as possible to reduce conflict and 
litigation. The simplest path is to treat all products with a utilitarian use as 
designs and not sculpture. The test for protection should not be separability 
of form and function, but a test far simpler to administer about whether 
utility exists at all. Such a test already exists in the copyright statute. The 
limited design protections for boat vessel hulls adopted in 1998 apply to 
“an original design of a useful article which makes the article attractive or 
distinctive in appearance to the purchasing or using public.”176 The same 
definition should be extended to cover other useful industrial designs.177 
B. Public Display Controls 
It already has been suggested that there is something deeply 
inconsistent in allowing artists control over the use of public displays of 
their works while wholly denying that right to architects. Using utility as a 
dividing line or excuse for distinguishing between some of these works 
makes neither aesthetic nor legal sense. Working through the issues 
requires three steps. First, Congress presented some rationales for the 
provisions in 17 U.S.C. § 120(a) rejecting control over public displays of 
architecture when it was adopted. Those rationales require review. Second, 
 
 175 Note that most types of copyrighted works compete with each other. Novels contest market 
share with other novels or books. The same is true of movies, television shows, dances, and pictorial, 
graphic, and sculptural works. There is very little likelihood of market dominance by a single work. 
One exception may be computer software and firmware—an area which in many ways is analogous to 
industrial design and should be granted a duration much like industrial design. 
 176 17 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(1) (2000). 
 177 A related possibility would be to consider the import of design patents. 35 U.S.C. § 171(a) 
protects an “ornamental design for an article of manufacture.” A full description of the requirements for 
obtaining such a patent are described in Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Design Patent Evolution: From 
Obscurity to Center Stage, 32 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 53 (2015). Like utility patents, 
applications must be made to the Patent & Trademark Office and reviewed to ensure that the design is 
novel and non-obvious. That process takes about fifteen months. Id. at 57. If granted, the patent extends 
only to the design, not to the underlying article of manufacture. And it is likely that a design patent 
could be held in addition to a copyright. Id. at 74–75. This suggests that further analysis here is not 
really necessary. Since the two are not mutually exclusive, my goal to ensure greater consistency within 
the structure of copyright law is not really affected by the existence of design patent protection. In 
addition, the length of time and the expense required to obtain a design patent suggest that the 
likelihood that many industrial designers would prefer to rely on easily obtained copyright protection 
than the more cumbersome patent system. That would be particularly likely if the reforms suggested 
here are put into effect. 
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are there other justifications for treating sculpture and buildings differently 
not mentioned during Congressional consideration of the provision? And 
finally, if, as I have stated, the present provisions are unfair, what is the 
best way to solve the problem? 
When 17 U.S.C. § 120(a) was adopted the House Report provided the 
following analysis of the provision: 
Similar exceptions are found in many Berne member countries, and serve to 
balance the interests of authors and the public. Architecture is a public art 
form and is enjoyed as such. Millions of people visit our cities every year and 
take back home photographs, posters, and other pictorial representations of 
prominent works of architecture as a memory of their trip. Additionally, 
numerous scholarly books on architecture are based on the ability to use 
photographs of architectural works. 
These uses do not interfere with the normal exploitation of architectural 
works. Given the important public purpose served by these uses and the lack 
of harm to the copyright owner’s market, the Committee chose to provide an 
exemption, rather than rely on the doctrine of fair use, which requires ad hoc 
determinations.178 
Much of this commentary is perfectly legitimate. Architecture, at least 
in its constructed versions, is a public art form. Photographs taken by 
tourists in outdoor public spaces routinely contain images of buildings. And 
scholarly works on architecture virtually always contain pictures of the 
buildings under discussion. None of this forms a justifiable basis for total 
exclusion of control over use of a publicly displayed piece of architecture. 
All of these actions are typically treated as fair use for public sculpture; no 
one would quarrel about them for public architecture either. 
But the final use mentioned—posters—does not fall into the same 
category. It is not an incidental consequence of the obvious visibility of 
architecture. It does have a potential impact on the economic value of 
copyrighted works and is not supported by the traditional settings in which 
fair use is routinely found—de minimis use,179 critical commentary, 
educational undertakings, and similar activities that have no significant 
commercial impact on the value of an architectural work or of markets for 
the architectural design. There is no logical reason for concluding that sale 
 
 178 H.R. REP. NO. 101–735, at 22 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6953. The 
report contains materials on a number of acts that were merged together prior to enactment, including 
the Copyright Amendments Act of 1990. 
 179 Another example of de minimis use would be taking skyline pictures a distance away from any 
particular structure. In that setting no particular work of architecture is the centerpiece of attention. And 
to the extent such images are sold, as souvenirs for example, the market is not based on a building but 
on a cityscape. 
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of posters of well-known paintings by museums should routinely be treated 
as royalty producing events while sales of similar items picturing well-
known buildings are not. Indeed, it may be the case that poster sales are the 
only important potential money making potential available to many 
architects for exploiting the value of already constructed buildings. Though 
the report was correct that fair use disputes sometime fall into open-ended 
“ad hoc determinations,” that is not always so. And in this case, it is not 
difficult to describe most of the settings in which granting architects an 
exclusive right to control use of buildings’ public display would lead to 
justifiable calls for licensing. None of them involve “horror stories” like 
private citizens being asked to pay for the privilege of taking family 
pictures in front of the East Wing of the National Gallery of Art. Indeed, 
these cases would come out pretty much the same as disputes over picture-
taking taken in front of Cloud Gate! Surely no one is going to be held liable 
for snapping a family image while cavorting in the belly of that beast!180 
And, assuming the basic structure of definitions of sculpture, industrial 
designs, and architecture are merged, posters of industrial designs made 
without permission also should be royalty producing events. 
When buildings play an important role in movies, there is nothing 
imaginary or fleeting about the money that architects could have 
demanded. The architecture problem has been visible in many films, 
though Leicester is the most important case in which the issues were 
seriously litigated. Some very famous buildings have been significant 
features in important films. They include The Dakota181 in Rosemary’s 
Baby, The Bradbury Building182 in Blade Runner, and The Stanley Hotel183 
in The Shining, to name just a few.184 Many others also have played 
important roles.185 While owners certainly may demand fees for allowing 
 
 180 And the enormous numbers of people visiting Cloud Gate take enormous number of pictures 
and videos when they visit. Just take a look at this video of a crowd of people milling about the work on 
a beautiful day. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VQbztwiojIQ [https://perma.cc/6FPA-JTRQ]. 
 181 Completed in 1884, The Dakota was the first apartment building constructed on the upper west 
side of Manhattan. John Lennon lived there when he was murdered in 1980, and his wife, Yoko Ono, 
still makes it home. 
 182 The Bradbury Building was constructed in 1893 and is the oldest remaining building in central 
Los Angeles. Its Victorian central atrium is a classic of late nineteenth century architecture. 
 183 The Stanley Hotel, located in Estes National Park in Colorado, opened in 1907. It is a grand, 
beautiful building in an extremely scenic place. 
 184 Liana Hayles, 10 Movies With Iconic Architecture in a Starring Role, ARCHITIZER (May 22, 
2014), https://architizer.com/blog/inspiration/collections/10-movies-with-iconic-architecture-in-a-
starring-role/ [https://perma.cc/6TBM-F7BK]. 
 185 See, e.g., Andrew Lasane, The Real-World Locations of Iconic Movie Homes, COMPLEX (Oct. 
22, 2014), https://www.complex.com/style/2014/10/the-real-world-locations-of-iconic-movie-
homes/the-shining [https://perma.cc/24QM-LNQN]; Saundra Latham, 21 Famous Movie Houses That 
Will Bring Back Memories, CHEAPISM (Feb. 8, 2019), https://blog.cheapism.com/famous-movie-
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movie makers access to their property or to the inside of their buildings, 
that does nothing for the architects or other parties holding the copyright in 
the building. Indeed, it only emphasizes the strangeness of the rule. 
These outcomes create my angst over the differences in treatment of 
publicly displayed pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, including 
industrial designs with separable aspects, versus works of architecture. The 
use of Cloud Gate as a significant part of the background setting of Batman 
Forever would surely require payment of a royalty. Even though the exact 
same statements in the House Report about works of architecture could be 
made about famous outdoor sculptural works,186 no one could justifiably 
claim that Anish Kapoor should be remediless under the statute. Or if the 
work of REVOK used by H&M was painted on a famous building, rather 
than a handball court wall, should there really be a major difference in the 
way the graffiti and the building are treated? That is hard to rationalize. 
The same dilemma, of course, played out in the Leicester litigation. 
Because of fame generated by its appearance in Batman Forever, fans of 
the film surely take random pictures of the Figueroa Street development 
and Landscape Sculptor’s interior courtyard that everyone agreed was 
separate from the architectural design of the office building itself.187 Should 
the sculpture and the interior courtyard receive different treatment just 
because one is deemed sculptural and the other architectural? That 
conclusion too is very difficult to support. 
What is the solution? The best result would be to handle the right to 
exploit publicly displayed copyrighted sculpture, industrial designs, and 
architecture under the same standard. In the cases discussed here, fair use 
defenses would be raised. A central feature of that jurisprudence is the 
strong tendency to deny fair use when the alleged infringing activity is 
highly commercial in nature.188 In the examples raised in the House Report 
supporting the enactment of 17 U.S.C. § 120(a), none were likely to have a 
commercial impact except the making of posters. In the absence of that 
 
houses/#image=1 [https://perma.cc/X3MT-N9UB]; Rudi Obias, 15 Real Movie Locations You Can 
Actually Visit, MENTAL FLOSS (Nov. 4, 2015), http://mentalfloss.com/article/60109/15-real-movie-
locations-you-can-actually-visit [https://perma.cc/6VT9-BBXS]; Ely Razin, 8 Buildings That Played a 
Starring Role in Hollywood Movies, FORBES (Apr. 28, 2016), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/elyrazin/2016/04/28/8-buildings-that-played-a-starring-role-in-
hollywood-movies/#3cd64705b3bd [https://perma.cc/944T-PPAL]. 
 186 See H.R. REP. NO. 101–735 supra note 178. 
 187 Leicester v. Warner Bros., 232 F.3d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 188 That’s been true for quite some time. The decision, for example, in Sony Corp. of America v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449–50 (1984) relied heavily on analysis of the economic 
impact of the video tape recorder on the market for movies and television. Concluding that the time 
delay feature of the then new technology had no significant impact on the market for the shows taped, 
the Court refused to label the machine makers as secondary infringers. Id. 
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section, the same examples would lead to the same conclusions about 
picture taking of buildings. And many other occurrences in which images 
of publicly visible sculpture, designs, or buildings might be made also 
would probably be fair use. Quick scans of street scenes, museum galleries, 
and industrial design convention halls provide only a small sampling of 
uses likely to be deemed fair, even in audio visual works. On the other 
hand, more intense use of images of sculptural works, industrial designs, or 
works of architecture as backgrounds for movie settings would rely upon 
the creative talents of others to make money—a use highly unlikely to be 
protected as fair use. That is as it should be. Copyright law has long been 
premised on the assumption that economic incentives to produce creative 
works are a principal reason for enacting intellectual property protections. 
And those incentives are traditionally deemed to include not only the right 
to demand fees for the transfer of the work itself, but also for commercial 
uses that others might wish to indulge in that make use of the original 
work. That is exactly what was at stake in Leicester. Denying those owning 
rights in either a sculptural or architectural work the right to receive such 
payments is contrary to the basic spirit and purposes of copyright law. 
 
